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IN 1987,  the unemployment  rate  in Massachusetts  averaged  3.2 percent, 
three  percentage  points  below the national  rate. Only  four  years later,  in 
1991, it stood at 9.0 percent, more than two points above the national 
rate. For  firms  taking  investment  decisions and  for  unemployed  workers 
thinking  about relocating, the obvious question is whether and when 
things  will return  to normal  in Massachusetts.  This is the issue that we 
take up in our paper. 
However, instead  of looking  only at Massachusetts,  we examine  the 
general  features  of regional  booms and slumps,  studying  the behavior  of 
U.S. states over the last 40 years  . We attempt  to answer  four questions. 
When  a typical U.S. state over the postwar  period  has been affected  by 
an adverse shock to employment,  how has it adjusted?  Did wages de- 
cline  relative  to the rest of the nation?  Were  otherjobs  created  to replace 
those jobs destroyed by the shock? Or did workers move out of the 
state? 
Our  interest  in these questions  extends beyond regional  economics. 
Blocs of countries, notably  those in the European  Community,  are in- 
creasingly  eliminating  barriers  to the mobility  of goods and factors and 
moving  toward  adopting  a common currency. Once these institutional 
changes  are in place, economic interactions  among  these countries  will 
more  closely resemble  those of U.S. states. This paper  offers at least a 
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glimpse  of the nature  and  the strength  of the macroeconomic  adjustment 
mechanisms  upon  which  these countries  increasingly  will rely. 
We start  by drawing  a general  picture  of state evolutions  over the last 
40 years. The most striking  feature  is the range  of employment  growth 
rates  across states. Over  the last 40 years, some states have consistently 
grown  at 2 percent  above the national  average, while some states have 
barely grown, with rates 2 percent below the national  average. Rather 
than  leading  to fluctuations  around  trends,  employment  shocks  typically 
have permanent  effects. A state that experiences an acceleration  or a 
slowdown in growth  can expect to return  to the same growth  rate, but 
on a permanently  different  path  of employment.  The picture  is very dif- 
ferent  when one looks at unemployment  rates. Relative  unemployment 
rates have exhibited  no trend;  moreover, shocks to relative  unemploy- 
ment rates have lasted for only one-half  decade or so. Thus unemploy- 
ment patterns  present an image of vacillating  state fortunes as states 
move from above to below the national  unemployment  rate, and vice 
versa. Finally,  the last  40 years  have  been characterized  by a steady  con- 
vergence  of relative  wages, a fact documented  recently  by Robert  Barro 
and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  (using  personal  income per capita  rather  than 
wages).1  As for unemployment,  the effects of shocks to relative  wages 
appear  to be transitory,  disappearing  within  a decade or so. 
We next develop a simple  model  that  can account  for these facts. We 
think of states as producing  different  bundles of goods, all sold on the 
national  market.  We assume  that  production  takes place under  constant 
returns  and that there is infinite  long-run  mobility  of both workers and 
firms.  Under  these two assumptions,  our model  implies  that  differences 
in the amenities  offered  by states to either  workers  or firms  lead to per- 
manent differences in  growth rates.  However,  while employment 
growth  rates  differ,  labor  and  product  mobility  lead to a stable  structure 
of unemployment  and  wage  differentials.  Thus  the model  can  explain  the 
observed trends. Moreover, the model can help us think about the 
shocks and mechanisms underlying  regional slumps and booms. As 
states produce different bundles of goods, they experience different 
shocks to labor  demand  and  thus experience  state-specific  fluctuations. 
Shocks to labor  demand  first  lead to movements  in relative wages and 
unemployment.  These in turn trigger  adjustments  through  both labor 
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and  firm  mobility,  until  unemployment  and  wages have returned  to nor- 
mal. By then, however, employment  is permanently  affected; to what 
extent depends on the relative speed at which workers  and firms  adjust 
to changes  in wages and  unemployment.  In the rest of the paper,  we use 
this model as a guide  to interpreting  the  joint movements  in relative  em- 
ployment,  unemployment,  wages, and  prices.2 
Our  third  section clears some empirical  underbrush.  First, we exam- 
ine the issue of how much  of the movement  in state employment  is com- 
mon  to states and  how much  is state-specific.  The answer  is simple. Ag- 
gregate  fluctuations  account for most of the year-to-year  movement in 
state employment, but their importance  declines steadily over longer 
horizons. We then address  the practical  issue of how one should  define 
and  construct  state relative  variables.  After  considering  alternatives,  we 
define  all variables  as logarithmic  deviations  from  the national  average. 
We then look at joint movements in employment, unemployment, 
and  participation.  We find  very similar  results across states. A negative 
shock  to employment  leads initially  to an increase  in unemployment  and 
a small  decline in participation.  Over  time, the effect on employment  in- 
creases, but the effect on unemployment  and participation  disappears 
after approximately  five to seven years. Put another  way, a state typi- 
cally returns  to normal  after  an adverse shock not because employment 
picks up, but  because workers  leave the state. These results  raise  an ob- 
vious set of questions:  does employment  fail to pick up because wages 
have not declined enough or because lower wages are not enough to 
boost employment? 
We take up that  question  in the next section, where  we examine  joint 
fluctuations  in employment,  unemployment,  wages, and  prices. We find 
that  in response  to an adverse shock in employment,  nominal  wages de- 
cline strongly  before returning  to normal  after approximately  10 years. 
This  decline  triggers  some recovery  in employment,  but the response  of 
job creation  to wage declines is not sufficient  to fully offset the initial 
shock. Using prices as well as wages, we characterize  the response of 
consumption  wages to employment  shocks. We find that consumption 
wages decline little in response to such shocks because housing  prices, 
in particular,  respond  strongly  to employment  shocks. Thus migration 
2. To our  knowledge,  such a description  is not available  in the regional  literature.  An 
important  exception  is Bartik  (1991),  which  covers some of the same  ground  as we do and 
provides  a careful  literature  survey.  We relate  our  conclusions  to Bartik's  below. 4  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
in response  to shocks appears  to result  more  from  changes  in unemploy- 
ment  than  from  changes  in relative  consumption  wages. 
Throughout  our paper, we identify  innovations  in employment  with 
shocks to labor demand. Because we consistently find that positive 
shocks to employment  increase wages and reduce unemployment,  we 
are  comfortable  with  this identification  assumption.  At the end  of the pa- 
per, we follow an alternative  and more conventional  approach.  We ex- 
amine the effects of two observable and plausibly  exogenous demand 
shocks: defense contracts, and predicted  growth  rates of employment, 
using  the state industry  shares  and  the national  growth  rates  for each in- 
dustry. We characterize  their effects on employment and unemploy- 
ment. The picture  that emerges is consistent with our earlier  findings: 
the effects on unemployment  of employment changes predicted by 
changes in defense spending  and by our industry mix instrument  are 
quite similar to those we  estimated for overall innovations in em- 
ployment. 
In the conclusion, we summarize  the mechanisms  underlying  typical 
regional  slumps and booms. Having done so, we return  to the case of 
Massachusetts. We then take up three larger issues.  First, we ask 
whether  the adjustment  process that we have characterized  is efficient. 
In response to shocks, should workers or jobs move? Our empirical 
work, which is largely  descriptive,  cannot  answer  the question,  but the 
results  provide  a few hints. We indicate  how sharper  conclusions  could 
result  from  further  micro-empirical  work on the nature  of the labor  mi- 
gration  and on the ways in which shocks affect the process of job cre- 
ation  and  destruction.  We then draw  the implications  of our  findings  for 
an understanding  of differences  in regional  growth,  because we think- 
and our model formalizes-that  the dynamic mechanisms  at work are 
largely  the same. Finally, we discuss the implications  and limits of our 
analysis for European  countries as they move to form a common cur- 
rency area. 
Background 
We begin by laying out basic facts about regional  evolutions of em- 
ployment,  unemployment,  and  wages in the postwar  period. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  5 
Figure 1.  Persistence of Employment Growth Rates across U.S.  States,  1950-90 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  using data from Employment anid  Earninlgs. See the appendix for more information. 
Annual employment  growth  is  measured  by  the average  annual change  in log employment  over  the specified  time 
span. 
Trends and Fluctuations  in Relative  Employment 
Over  the last  forty years, U.S. states have experienced  large  and sus- 
tained  differences  in employment  growth  rates. This experience  is illus- 
trated  in figure  1, which  plots average  nonfarm  employment  growth  from 
1950  to 1970  against  average  nonfarm  employment  growth  from 1970  to 
1990.  (A few states have a later starting  date. The appendix  gives exact 
definitions,  sources and coverage  for the series used in this paper.)  The 
line  is a regression  line and  has a slope of 0.70 and  an  R2  of 0.75. Arizona, 
Florida,  and  Nevada  have consistently  grown  at 2 percent  above the na- 
tional  average.  Even leaving  these states out, the  R2 is still  equal  to 0.60. 
Massachusetts,  New York, Pennsylvania,  Rhode Island,  and  West Vir- 
ginia  have consistently  grown  at rates  much  below the national  average. 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
The variation  in growth  rates is substantially  greater  among  large U.S. 
states than  among  European  countries.3 
It is true  that, over much longer  periods, trends  in state relative  em- 
ployment  growth  have changed. The Northeast grew before relatively 
declining, the South stagnated  before growing, and so on. However, 
over the postwar period, those trends have been surprisingly  stable.4 
Thus figure  1 puts such stories as the turnaround  of the South after  the 
introduction  of civil rights  in the 1960s  and  the "Massachusetts  miracle" 
of the early 1980s  in the proper  perspective. 
Figure  2 gives a sense of regional  trends as well as fluctuations  by 
showing  the evolution  of employment  for a number  of states. It plots em- 
ployment  for New England,  the Mid-Atlantic  states, the Rust Belt, the 
Sun  Belt, the farm  states, and  the oil states since 1947,  measured  relative 
to U.S. aggregate  employment.  The Massachusetts  miracle  of the 1980s 
is little more than a blip on a downward  trend. The experience  of New 
York  is similarly  depressing.  Ohio and Illinois  also display steady rela- 
tive employment  losses, with  losses accelerating  in the late 1970s.  Mich- 
igan's substantial  postwar  relative  employment  decline is concentrated 
in two sharp  adverse shocks that affected the auto industry  in 1956-58 
and 1979-82.  In contrast  to those states, the Sun Belt states have grown 
consistently since 1947;  note the size of the scale of the vertical axis. 
Two sets of states-not  surprisingly,  the farm  and  the oil states-exhibit 
a different  behavior.  The farm  states do not exhibit a trend, but rather 
large fluctuations,  culminating  in the farm crisis of the 1980s.5  The oil 
states exhibit  a boom in the 1970s,  followed by a bust in the 1980s. 
Having  displayed  our  findings  graphically,  we turn  to a formal  charac- 
terization of the stochastic behavior of relative employment move- 
ments. We define nit  as the logarithm  of employment  in state i in year t 
minus  the logarithm  of U.S. employment  in year t. Because most states 
clearly  have a trend  in relative  employment,  and we do not find  the hy- 
pothesis of deterministic  trends  appealing,  our assumption  is that their 
process contains  a unit root. We nevertheless  test for evidence against 
a unit  root by running  for each state 
3. See, for  example,  Krugman  (1992). 
4. In fact, an influential  article by Borts (1960) documents  that state employment 
growth  trends  were  fairly  persistent  from  1909  to 1953. 
5. However,  in looking  at farm  states, remember  that  our data  measure  nonfarm  em- 
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(1)  Anit  =  Oli  +  -2i (L) Ani,tl I+  ?  a3i  ni,t-  I+  ?t4i  T +  rit, 
where T  is time and  nit  is a disturbance  term. 
We allow  for four  lags in  O2i (L).6 The period  of estimation  is 1952-90. 
The evidence from augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests, which look at the t 
statistic  on (3i,  the coefficient  associated  with  the lagged  level, is mixed. 
In all states, the coefficient  on the lagged  level is negative. But in only 
three states-Massachusetts,  South Dakota, and Wyoming-is  it sig- 
nificant  at the 5 percent level. Thus, given our prior, we impose from 
here on the hypothesis  of a unit  root in relative  employment.7 
We then estimate  the univariate  process for employment  by running 
from 1952  to 1990: 
(2)  A\nit  =Oli  +  t2i (L) A\ni,  l-  +  q  it 
We allow for four lags in O2i (L). From these estimated  coefficients, 
we derive the associated impulse response, which gives the response 
of the level of relative employment  to an innovation in -q  implied by 
equation  2. Regression  coefficients and impulse  responses are given in 
table 1. 
The results in table 1 are obtained by pooling all states together, 
allowing  for state effects. Throughout  the paper, we take advantage  of 
the cross section and time series dimensions  of our data by estimating 
equations  not only state-by-state  but  also for  pooled sets of states. When 
pooling,  we either  pool all 50 states  and  the District  of Columbia  together 
as in table 1, or pool them  by Census  division.8  There  are nine such divi- 
sions; they are relatively  homogeneous  and thus provide  a natural  way 
to pool states.9  Because of their different  patterns, we also often look 
separately  at farm states and oil and mineral states. We define farm 
states as those states in which earnings  from agriculture  accounted  for 
6. We include  a time trend  to allow the process to have a deterministic  trend  under 
the alternative  hypothesis.  For  further  discussion,  see, for  example,  Campbell  and  Perron 
(1991). 
7. We have checked  the robustness  of our results  below to relaxing  this assumption. 
The impulse  responses  obtained  from  estimating  a univariate  process  assuming  stationar- 
ity of relative  employment  around  a deterministic  trend  are very similar  to those reported 
in table 1, at least  for  the first  15  years  or so. 
8. For the sake of brevity,  in the rest of this paper,  we refer  to the 50 U.S. states and 
the District  of Columbia  as the 51 states. 
9. The  Census  uses two classification  levels, regions  and  divisions.  The  four  regions- 
the Northeast,  the Midwest,  the South,  and  the West-are  very heterogenous  and  are not 
an appealing  way of grouping  states. Figure 2.  Cumulative Employment Growth, U.S.  States Relative to the National 
Average, 1947-90 
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Table 1.  Univariate Models of Relative Employment, Unemployment, and Wages 
Log  employment  Uneemploymenit  Log 
Result  change  rate  w,age 
Regression  results 
Coefficient  on 
lagged dependent  variable 
One lag  0.492  0.899  1.072 
(0.023)  (0.032)  (0.023) 
Two lags  -0.099  -0.159  -0.129 
(0.025)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
Three lags  0.010  ..  .  0.057 
(0.024)  (0.034) 
Four lags  -  0.054  ..  .  -0.074 
(0.022)  (0.024) 
Standard error  0.017  0.083  0.016 
Implied impulse responises 
Year  1  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Year 2  1.49  0.90  1.07 
Year 3  1.63  0.65  1.02 
Year 4  1.67  0.44  1.01 
Year 5  1.62  0.29  0.94 
Year  10  1.52  0.04  0.57 
Year 20  1.53  0.01  0.19 
Source:  Estimates  of univariate equations  using data described  in the appendix.  Periods of estimation are 1952-90 
for employment  and wages  and 1972-90 for unemployment.  Standard errors of the coefficients  are in parentheses. 
more than 4 percent of earnings  in 1980:  they are, in decreasing  order, 
South Dakota, Idaho, Iowa,  Montana, North Dakota, Wisconsin, 
Hawaii, Arkansas, and Nebraska. We define oil and mineral  states as 
those states  in  which  earnings  from  oil, gas, and  other  minerals  accounted 
for more  than  2 percent  of earnings  in 1980:  they are Alaska, Colorado, 
Louisiana, Montana,  New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,  Texas, 
West Virginia,  and  Wyoming.  When  pooling,  we shall  allow  for state ef- 
fects-that  is, for a different  constant  term  for each state. 
Table 1 shows that, in response to an innovation  of 1.0, employment 
increases  to about 1.67  after  four years and  then in the long run  reaches 
a plateau at about 1.5. This hump shape is present in nearly all states 
when the response  is estimated  individually.  The long-run  response  lies 
between 1.0 and 2.0 for 40 states. No obvious pattern  occurs in the out- 
liers: Massachusetts  (3.30) and Wyoming  (3.15) are on the high side, 
while Missouri (0.86) and Michigan  (0.95) are on the low side. In the 
process of estimating  individual  impulse  responses, we also test for sta- Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  11 
Figure 3.  Persistence of Unemployment Rates across U.S.  States,  1975-85 
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Statistics  unemployment  rates for Labor Market Areas. 
bility of mean growth  rates across time, by allowing  for different  inter- 
cepts for 1950-70  and 1970-90  for each state. In only two states-Maine 
and  Washington-are the mean  growth  rates significantly  different  over 
the two subperiods. 
To summarize,  the correct  image  of employment  evolutions  is one of 
states growing  at different  rates, with shocks having  largely  permanent 
effects. In response to an adverse shock, employment  eventually  ends 
up growing  at the same  underlying  rate, but at a lower level. 
The Low Persistence  of Relative  Unemployment Rates 
In contrast  to employment,  relative unemployment  rates exhibit no 
trend  and do not exhibit high persistence. Reasonably  consistent mea- 
sures of state unemployment  rates are available  or can be constructed 
back only to 1970  (see the appendix  for details). Figure  3 plots relative 12  Brookings Paper-s oni  Economic Activity, 1  :1992 
unemployment  rates 10 years apart, in 1975  and in 1985. The line is a 
regression  line with a slope of 0.03, a t statistic  of 0.2, and an  R2  of 0.00. 
The fact that  relative  unemployment  rates show low persistence  was al- 
ready mentioned  by Stephen Marston  and Lawrence Summers.'0  It is 
probably  this fact that  underlies  the frequently  stated  account of fluctu- 
ating state fortunes; however, as we have seen, a different  picture is 
given by employment  evolutions. 
We must admit  that the two dates used in figure  3 yield a unusually 
low correlation.  Had  we used, say, relative  unemployment  rates  in 1970 
and 1990, the regression  coefficient would be 0.41, with a t statistic of 
3.8 and an R2 of 0.23.11 This positive correlation has two potential 
origins. The first is that relative unemployment  rates have different 
means  across states. The second is that  deviations  from  means  are very 
persistent. It turns  out that the positive correlation  comes mostly from 
the means, not from  the persistence  of the effect of shocks. As a simple 
exercise, for example, one can exclude the farm  states from  the regres- 
sion, because they clearly  have lower average  unemployment  rates. The 
coefficient  then drops  to 0.24, with an R2  of 0.11. 
To go further,  we more formally  examine the stochastic  behavior  of 
relative  unemployment  rates. We define  uit  as the unemployment  rate  in 
state i at time t minus the U.S. unemployment  rate. We first check for 
stationarity  by running,  for the period 1972-90, 
(3)  Auit =  oxli +  o1x2i  (L)  uiu,t-1  +  X3L  ui,t1 I  +  qit- 
Because relative unemployment  rates do not exhibit a trend, we do 
not allow  for one in the regression.  Because the sample  period  is shorter 
than for employment,  we allow for only two lags in cv2i  (L). The results 
from  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests are again  mixed. In all states, coef- 
ficients on the lagged level are negative, usually between -0.2  and 
10.  Marston (1985); Summers (1986). 
11.  Neumann and Topel (1991) report substantially higher intertemporal correlations 
of relative state unemployment  rates for the  1970-85 period using labor-force-weighted 
correlations of three-year moving averages of relative state insured unemployment rates. 
The  differences  between  their results  and ours  do  not  reflect  their use  of  labor force 
weights  or smoothed  unemployment  rates (three year averages);  rather, they reflect the 
differences between insured and overall unemployment rates. Differences  in the generos- 
ity and administration of state unemployment  insurance systems  lead to persistent mean 
differences in insured unemployment rates across states that lead to much higher intertem- 
poral correlations of insured, than of overall, state unemployment rates. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  13 
- 0.4. However, in only two states is the hypothesis of a unit root re- 
jected at the 5 percent  level.  12 Our  prior,  on theoretical  grounds,  is that 
relative  unemployment  rates  are stationary;  we see the evidence as con- 
sistent with this prior;  in regressions  below, we use the level rather  the 
first  difference  of the unemployment  rate. 
We then  estimate  the univariate  process  for  unemployment  and  its as- 
sociated  impulse  response. We specify an autoregressive  (AR(2))  proc- 
ess for relative  unemployment  rates and first estimate it for each state 
separately.  The results are very similar  across states. The typical im- 
pulse response shows relative unemployment  rates returning  to their 
mean  after  six to ten years. The coefficients  and impulse  response  func- 
tions when all states are pooled, allowing  for state fixed effects, are re- 
ported  in table 1. The effect of a shock  falls to only 29 percent  of the ini- 
tial shock within five years and is essentially equal to zero within ten 
years. 
Thus  in contrast  to similar  analyses  of aggregate  unemployment  rates 
for the United States and other countries,  relative  unemployment  rates 
for the U.S. states return  to their  mean  relatively  quickly  after  a shock. 
This moderately  rapid  return  to the mean implies that differences be- 
tween state average  unemployment  rates over periods  of 20 or so years 
mostly reflect  differences  in underlying  state means, rather  than  persis- 
tence of unemployment  deviations. 
The Convergence  of  Wages 
In a recent Brookings  paper,  Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  carefully  docu- 
mented  the convergence  of state  personal  income  per  capita  over the last 
100  years, as well as over subperiods  such as the postwar  period.  13 Very 
much  the same  findings  hold  for available  measures  of wages. Our  basic 
measure  of wages is average  hourly  earnings  of production  workers in 
manufacturing;  the figures are available for nearly all states back to 
1950.14 Figure  4 plots  the average  rate  of growth  of hourly  manufacturing 
12. The difficulty of rejecting the hypothesis  of a unit root has also been  noted by 
Eichengreen (1992). 
13.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). 
14.  We also construct and use wage series that cover all workers and control for com- 
position  effects,  using the Current Population  Survey  (CPS).  However,  the  series  are 
available only since 1979 on an annual basis for reasonably large samples for each state. 14  Br-ookings  Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 4.  Convergence of Manufacturing Wages across U.S.  States,  1950-90 
Annual  manufacturing  wage growth, 1950-90 (percent) 
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wages from 1950  to 1990  against  their  log value in 1950.15  The line is the 
regression  line with a slope of - 0.01, a t statistic of 5.4, and an R2 of 
0.39.  16 By comparison,  a similar  regression  of the average  growth  rate  of 
personal  income per capita  from 1948  to 1990  on the log of the starting 
value has the same estimated  slope of - 0.01, a t statistic  of 6.8, and an 
R2 of 0.50. 
As for employment  and  unemployment,  we examine  the properties  of 
the stochastic  process followed by w,t,  the logarithm  of the manufactur- 
ing wage in state i at time t minus  the logarithm  of the U.S. wage at time 
15.  Some states have a later starting date. See the appendix. 
16.  Although over the entire postwar period the growth rate of average hourly manu- 
facturing wages  is  strongly  negatively  related to the  starting value,  the persistence  of 
growth rates of state wage rates across subperiods is much less strong than the persistence 
in employment growth rates. For example,  the correlation of the growth rate of average 
hourly manufacturing wages from 1950 to 1970 with that from 1970 to 1990 is only 0.13. 
Thus we emphasize  the persistence  of employment  growth rate trends and the conver- 
gence of wages. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  15 
t. Because this has been done by others using closely related  series, we 
do not go into  the results  at length.  We first  check for stationarity  by run- 
ning, for 1952-90,  a regression  with the same specification  as equation 
3, but  using  relative  wages, with  four  lags rather  than  two because of the 
longer  sample.  The coefficients  on the lagged  relative  wage are negative 
in 46 of the 51 states, but the hypothesis  of a unit root is rejected  at the 
5 percent  level only for 3 states. Our  prior  again  is one of stationarity  of 
relative  wages. We see the evidence as consistent with that prior, and 
use the level of wages, rather  than the first  difference,  in the work that 
follows. We then  estimate  a univariate  process  for relative  wages, speci- 
fying an AR(4) process, pooling all states while allowing  for fixed ef- 
fects. As table 1 shows, relative  wages return  to their  mean  more slowly 
than unemployment.  The response to a unit shock has a slight hump- 
shape pattern  with the effect increasing  to 1.07 after 2 years and then 
slowly decreasing  to 0.94 after  5 years, 0.57 after 10  years, and  0.19 after 
20 years. 
Simple Models of Regional Evolutions 
We now construct  a simple  model  that  not only naturally  explains  ba- 
sic univariate  facts about  regional  evolutions  in employment,  unemploy- 
ment, and wages, but also gives us a guide for further  empirical  work. 
Our  model is based on two ideas: that states produce  different  bundles 
of goods;  and  that  both  labor  and  firms  are  mobile  across states. We start 
with a full employment  version; later we allow for unemployment  and 
other  extensions. 
A Full Employment Model of Employment and  Wages 
We think  of each state  as producing,  at any point  in time, a given bun- 
dle of products.  Production  takes place under  constant  returns  to labor 
and  the demand  for each product  is downward  sloping.  Thus, we specify 
labor  demand  in state i at time t as 
(4)  wit =  - dnit +  zit 
where wit is the relative  wage, nit  is relative employment,  and zit is the 
position  of the labor  demand  curve. All variables  are in logarithms  and 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
measured  relative  to their aggregate  U.S. counterparts.  The coefficient 
d is positive, reflecting  the downward  sloping  demand  for each product. 
Under  the assumption  of full employment,  employment  nit  is given at 
any point  in time, so that  movements  in z translate  into movements  in w. 
Those movements  in wages (and  in the later  version  of the model, move- 
ments in unemployment  as well), however, trigger two adjustment 
mechanisms  involving  workers  and  products.  These are captured  in our 
two other  assumptions. 
We first  formalize  the movement  in z as 
(5)  zi,t+  -  -  -awit  +  Xdi  +  ?-,t+  I 
where  xdi is a constant,  Ed is white noise, and  a is a positive parameter. 
Consider  first  the case where  a is equal  to zero, which  corresponds  to 
the case where each state keeps the same bundle  of products  over time. 
Demands  for individual  products  grow at different  rates and shocks to 
relative  demand  are  for the most part  permanent.  Different  products  ex- 
perience  technological  progress  at different  rates  and  relative  technolog- 
ical shocks also are for the most part  permanent.  Thus relative  derived 
demands  for labor  for each good are  likely to have both a unit  root and  a 
drift  component.  If states produce  fixed  bundles  of goods, those proper- 
ties will translate  to state-relative  derived demands  for labor. This is 
what equation  5 yields when a is equal  to zero. Given the wage, the de- 
rived demand  for labor in state i follows a random  walk with drift. We 
shall  refer  to  d as the innovation  to labor  demand. 
However, the bundle  of goods produced  by states changes  over time. 
Some states consistently attract  new industries, while some states do 
not. Thus the drift  term,  Xdi, does double  duty. Not only does it capture 
drifts  in the demands  for individual  products  as we saw above, but  it also 
captures  "amenities,"  elements  other  than  wages-such  as public  sector 
infrastructure,  natural  resources, local taxes, and  the regulatory  and  la- 
bor relations  environment-that affect firms'  decisions to create or lo- 
cate their  business someplace.  17 But location/creation  decisions  also de- 
17.  The reasons  why  some  cities,  states,  or regions are more attractive than others 
remain largely mysterious-despite  an abundant literature, as well as a revival of theoreti- 
cal and empirical work in the recent past. For a review of the older literature on regions, 
see for example Weinstein, Gross, and Rees (1985). For examples of recent theoretical and 
empirical work on states,  see Krugman (1992); for work on cities,  see Glaeser and others 
(1991). Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  17 
pend on wages. This is what is captured  by the parameter  a: everything 
else being equal, lower wages make a state more attractive.'8  One im- 
portant  question is whether in response to an adverse shock that de- 
creases wages, everything  else would indeed  remain  equal. This matter 
will be easier  to discuss when we introduce  unemployment  to our  model 
below. Note that  the above formulation  implies  a short-run  elasticity  of 
a and  a long-run  elasticity  of infinity. 
We formalize  the movement  in the labor  force, n, as 
(6)  nit+1  -  nit -  bwit +  Xsi +  Esi1t+, 
where  xsi  is a constant,  Es is white noise, and b is a positive parameter. 
Most of the differences  in average  employment  growth  rates across 
states are due to migration,  rather  than  to differences  in natural  popula- 
tion growth  rates.  19  In fact, the correlation  of state employment  growth 
and net migration  rates is 0.84 for the 1950-87 period and 0.91 for the 
1970-87  period.20  Thus we can think of the equation  as characterizing 
migration  of workers. 
Equation  6 allows migration  to depend on three terms: the relative 
wage, a drift  term, and a stochastic  component.  The drift  term,  xsi,  cap- 
tures amenities, those nonwage factors that affect migration.  Stories 
about  the attractiveness  of the California  lifestyle and Sun Belt weather 
are common  features  of descriptions  of regional  migration  patterns.  By 
assuming  that  these amenities-and the amenities  affecting  firms,  Xdi, in 
equation  5-are  time-invariant,  we ignore  such factors as the introduc- 
tion of air  conditioning,  which  clearly  increased  the attractiveness  of the 
South. Allowing amenities to evolve would, in our model, lead to 
changes  in the underlying  growth  rate of a state. But as we showed ear- 
lier, little evidence exists of changes in underlying  state growth rates 
18.  A straightforward extension  would be to make firms' location decisions  a function 
of current and future expected  wages.  The obvious  implication is that firms will respond 
less to current wages if (as is the case in this model) wages are expected  to return to their 
state-specific mean. 
19.  See Turek (1985) for an analysis of the roles played by net migration and natural 
population increase in differences in regional population growth in the twentieth century. 
20.  The net migration rates refer to averages of rates for the subperiods 1950-60,  1960- 
70,  1970-80,  and 1980-87,  weighted  by the lengths of the subperiod.  The rate for each 
subperiod is the annual average rate of net migration divided by state population at the 
start of the subperiod. The migration data include the entire population, not only the work- 
ing age population. Further information appears in the appendix. 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
over the postwar  period, so that we do not pursue  that extension. The 
term, Ei +i, captures  those clearly transitory  movements in exogenous 
migration,  such as boat lifts, changes  in immigration  laws, or deteriora- 
tions of economic conditions in Mexico, that lead to increased migra- 
tion. We shall refer to Ei as the innovation  in labor supply. The wage 
term captures  the effects of wages on migration:  everything  else being 
equal, lower wages decrease in-migration.21  Again, the research  on mi- 
gration  has emphasized  the fact that, in response to an adverse shock, 
everything  else may not be equal;  for example, unemployment  is an im- 
portant  determinant  of migration.  We return  to this when we introduce 
unemployment.  Lastly, note that  the above formulation  implies  a short- 
run elasticity of migration  to the wage of b and a long-run  elasticity of 
infinity. 
Wages and Employment 
Under  our assumptions,  states indeed exhibit  different  growth  rates. 
Supply  and  demand  innovations  permanently  affect employment.  Aver- 
age relative  wages differ  across states, but  relative  wages are stationary. 
To see this, we can solve for wages to get 
wijt+I  =  (1  -  db  -  a)wit  + (xdi-  dxsi)  +  (E6't+I  -  dEi  t+  ) 
so that  the average  relative  wage is given by 
wi=  (1/(a +  db))xdi -  (dl(a+db))xsi. 
We can also solve for employment  to get 
\ni,t  +I  =  (1  -  db -  a) Anit + (bxdi + axsi) 
? 
(bEt+j  +  ?  Et+  -(I  -a)  Es) 
so that  trend  employment  growth  is given by 
Ani = (bl(a + db))Xdi  +  (al(a  +  db)) xsi. 
As long as there is either  labor  or product  mobility  (a or b > 0), rela- 
tive wages follow a stationary  process around  state-specific  means, with 
the innovations  to labor demand  and to labor supply as forcing  terms. 
21.  A useful extension would be to make worker migration decisions  a function of cur- 
rent and future expected  wages,  as in Braun (1992) and Topel (1986). Olivier Jean Blanchar-d  and Lawr-ence  F. Katz  19 
Thus, starting  from any distribution  of relative wages, the distribution 
of relative  wages will converge  to a stationary  distribution  over time.22 
In contrast,  relative  employment  grows  or declines at an average  rate 
determined  by both drifts. In states attractive  to workers, states where 
xsi  is positive, the steady flow of workers  leads to a lower wage, which 
in turn  triggers  a steady flow of new  jobs and sustains  growth. In states 
attractive  to firms, states where  Xdi is positive, the steady flow of firms 
leads to a higher  wage, which in turn  triggers  an inflow  of workers  and 
sustains  growth.  In contrast  to wages, innovations  to both  labor  demand 
and  labor  supply  permanently  affect the level of employment. 
The Effects  of an Innovation  in Labor Demand 
Most of our  focus below will be on what  happens  to states that  face a 
shock, adverse or favorable,  to the demand  for their goods. More for- 
mally, we examine the effects of an innovation  in labor demand.  Con- 
sider,  for example, the effects of an adverse shock to employment.  De- 
note by a hat the deviation  of a variable  from its base (no shock) path. 
Then, from the equations  above, the effects of an innovation  of - 1 in 
period  0 in Ei on wages and  employment  at time t are given by 
wit=  -(1  -  a -  db)t->O, 
nit =-b(1  - (1  -  a -  db)t)/(a  +  db)  -bl(a  +  db). 
A negative innovation to labor demand initially decreases wages. 
Over  time, wages return  to normal  as net out-migration  of workers  and 
job creation reestablish the initial equilibrium.  The speed at which 
wages return  to normal  is an increasing  function  of both short-run  elas- 
ticities, a and  b. 
The response of employment  is the more interesting  of the two. Ini- 
tially, employment  remains unchanged  as wages absorb the adverse 
shift in demand (by the assumption  of full employment). Over time, 
however, employment  decreases relative  to its base path  to end asymp- 
totically lower by an amount equal to  -  bl(a + db). Thus, the long-run 
decrease  in employment  depends  on the relative  values of the short-run 
elasticities  of firms  and  workers. 
22.  This is what Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) have called a-convergence. 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 5.  Adjustment of Labor Demand and Supply to an Adverse Demand Shock 
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To see why, a simple  labor demand-labor  supply diagram  is useful. 
Suppose  that  a state is initially  at point  E in figure  5, with inelastic  labor 
supply  SS, and  downward  sloping  labor  demand  DD-corresponding to 
equation  4 for a given value of z. (We ignore  trends  here.) At time 0, an 
adverse shock to demand  shifts DD to D'D';  under the assumption  of 
full employment,  we move to point  A in the figure.  Employment  is un- 
changed and the wage decreases to wa. This triggers  two adjustment 
mechanisms:  lower wages trigger  net out-migration  of workers, shifting 
SS steadily to the left; lower wages lead to net in-migration  of firms, 
shifting  D'D' steadily  back  to the right.  In the long run,  the wage must  be 
back  at wo,  but  employment  can be anywhere  between  B and  E. Where  it Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  21 
ends up depends  on the speed at which  the two loci shift, on the relative 
speeds at which workers  leave and firms  come. If workers  leave faster 
than firms  come, the outcome is E'. If workers  move more slowly, the 
outcome  is E". 
The importance  of the relative speeds in the adjustment  process is 
best illustrated  by an example, which also shows the many aspects of 
reality  hidden  in a and b. The computer  manufacturer  Wang  is located 
in Lowell, Massachusetts. Because the relative demand  for minicom- 
puters fell sharply, the unemployment  rate in Lowell has sharply in- 
creased, to an average  of 9.7 percent  in 1991.  Lowell is thus  a potentially 
attractive  place for firms, say, in the microcomputer  industry,  to relo- 
cate: if they come, they could hire from a pool of qualified  workers  at 
lower wages than firms could have a few years ago. Will those firms 
come and come in time? Will  workers, many of them unemployed,  and 
many  probably  liquidity-constrained,  be able to wait for firms  to come? 
Or will workers  have to move before new  jobs have been created, thus 
negating  the reasons for firms  to come in the first  place? Such different 
outcomes are captured  by points such as E' and  E" in figure  5. 
We have concentrated  on innovations  in labor  demand.  A symmetri- 
cal analysis  applies  to innovations  in labor  supply.  A positive innovation 
to labor supply decreases wages. Over time, wages return  to normal. 
And  in the process, employment  increases  relative  to its base path  to end 
up asymptotically  higher by al(a + db). Again, the long-run  effect de- 
pends on the ratio of the two elasticities. If, for example, a is equal to 
zero, the initial  increase in labor supply  is fully offset by out-migration 
in the long run. 
Allowing for  Unemnployment 
We now relax  the assumption  that  wages adjust  so as to maintain  full 
employment.  Under  any realistic  description  of wage determination,  the 
adjustment  process is likely  to involve movements  in unemployment,  as 
well as in wages. To capture  that, we modify  the model as follows: 
Wit  =  -  d(n,* -  Uit) +  zit; 
cwit  Uit; 
n*+I-  n*  bwit -  guit  + 
X,i  +  E5t+l; 
7  -  zit  ?a 
Xwit 
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The variable  n* stands for the logarithm  of the labor  force in state i at 
time t, and  uit is the unemployment  rate  in state i at time t, defined  as the 
ratio  of unemployment  to employment,  so that  the logarithm  of employ- 
ment is approximately given by n* -  uit.23 
Our  specification  of labor  demand  in the first  equation  is the same as 
before, but is now expressed as a relation  between unemployment  and 
the wage, given the labor  force. The second equation  is new: it states, 
in the simplest  possible way, that higher  unemployment  leads to lower 
wages. A more sophisticated  specification  would allow for the fact that 
wages are likely  to depend  on vacancies  as well, and  thus on the trend  in 
z; we shall not explore this specification.  The semi-elasticity  of wages 
with respect  to the unemployment  rate is given by (1/c). 
The important  modifications  are in the specification  of the last two 
equations. Research on labor migration  emphasizes the importance  of 
unemployment  and  job availability  in determining  migration.24  Thus  the 
third equation allows labor mobility to depend not only on relative 
wages, but also on relative  unemployment.  How does unemployment- 
given wages-affect  job creation  and the decisions of firms  to migrate? 
As the example of Lowell suggests, higher unemployment  implies a 
larger  pool of workers  to choose from  and thus makes  firms  more  likely 
to come. But higher  unemployment  also implies potentially  higher  tax 
rates, lower quality  public services, or fiscal crises and their attending 
uncertainty.  These factors are likely to deter firms  from coming to de- 
pressed states. As a first  approximation,  we assume in the last equation 
that firms' decisions do not depend on unemployment-although we 
would be as willing  to assume that firms  are reluctant  to locate in areas 
with  high  unemployment.  The algebra  is straightforward  and  the conclu- 
sions can be stated  in words. 
An underlying  positive drift  in relative labor demand,  xdi,  leads to a 
positive relative  trend  in employment,  higher-than-average  wages, and 
lower-than-average  unemployment.25  An underlying  positive  drift  in rel- 
23.  To see that, let U, E, and L denote the levels of unemployment,  employment,  and 
the labor force.  Note  that it  =  UIE  ln(l  +  (UIE))  =  ln(L)-ln(E).  Thus (n1*  -  it) 
ln(L) -  ln(L) +  ln(E) =  ln(E). 
24.  See, for example, DaVanzo (1978) and Greenwood (1985). 
25.  This is one place where a more elaborate specification of wage determination could 
lead to different correlations.  High employment growth may lead to more vacancies  and 
higher wait unemployment. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  23 
ative labor  supply,  x,i, leads to a positive relative  trend  in employment, 
lower-than-average  wages, and  higher-than-average  unemployment. 
An adverse shock in the relative  demand  for labor  initially  increases 
unemployment  and decreases wages. Over time, net out-migration  of 
workers  and  net in-migration  of firms  lead  to a decline in unemployment 
and an increase  in wages. How much  of the adjustment  occurs through 
the creation  of new  jobs and  how much  occurs through  the migration  of 
workers  depends again on the short-run  elasticities. However, an im- 
portant difference exists, compared to our earlier, full employment, 
story. While  both high unemployment  and low wages lead to labor  mi- 
gration,  only lower  wages induce  firms  to come. Thus  the more  the initial 
decline in demand  is reflected  in unemployment,  rather  than  wages, the 
larger  the long-run  effect of adverse shocks on employment. 
Other Extensions 
The model  can easily accommodate  a number  of extensions. One  is to 
allow for capital  accumulation  by existing  firms.26  The effects of capital 
accumulation  by existing  firms  are very different  from  those induced  by 
the movement  of new firms.  While  adverse shocks to demand  may  lead, 
through  lower wages, to the in-migration  of firms,  they decrease  the re- 
turn  to capital  in existing firms.  This in turn  leads to capital  decumula- 
tion and the amplification  of the initial  shock. This makes it more  likely 
that  an adverse shock in demand  leads to a larger  effect on employment 
in the long  run  than  in the short  run.  Another  extension we have already 
mentioned  would  be to recognize  that  mobility  decisions are  likely to be 
forward  looking, so that the speed at which unemployment  and wages 
return  to normal  will affect the initial  mobility  decisions. 
However,  other  extensions would  more  drastically  change  the nature 
of the model. Two such extensions are the introduction  of land as a 
scarce  factor  and  the presence  of externalities.  One of the main  implica- 
tions of our  model  is thatfixed  differences  in amenities,  either  for work- 
ers or  for  firms,  lead  to sustained  differences  in growth  rates. This result 
comes in turn  from the underlying  assumptions  of constant returns  in 
production  and infinite  long-run  mobility of firms and workers. If we 
were to introduce  scarce  land,  the model  would lose its property  of con- 
26.  See Blanchard (1991). 24  Brookings  Paper  s on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
stant  returns.  Fixed amenities  would  no longer  lead to permanent  differ- 
ences in growth  rates, but instead to differences  in employment  levels 
and  land  prices.27  If we were instead  to introduce  externalities  (a theme 
explored  recently  by Paul  Krugman  and  others),  for example  by making 
the attractiveness  of a state,  Xdi, no a longer  a constant,  but  an increasing 
function  of the number  of products  in the state, the model would  gener- 
ate instead  accelerating  growth.28  We have no doubt  that  scarcity  of land 
and  various  forms  of externalities  associated  with  population  density  are 
relevant, although  perhaps  more for cities than for states; we see the 
constant  returns  assumptions  and  its implication  of constant  growth  dif- 
ferentials  as a convenient  simplification  and  a good approximation  to the 
data  over the postwar  period. 
Identification:  Labor Demand  or Labor Supply Shocks? 
In our empirical  work, we estimate  the reduced  forms-vector  auto- 
regressions  (VAR)-corresponding to our  model  in its different  incarna- 
tions and  trace  the effects of adverse shocks to demand,  the Ed, on such 
factors  as employment,  unemployment,  and  wages. This  raises  the issue 
of how we identify  Ed. 
Our  basic approach  to identification  is simple: we associate unfore- 
castable movements  in employment  with innovations  in labor  demand. 
This assumption  is approximately  correct  if most of the year-to-year  un- 
expected movements in employment  are caused by shifts in labor de- 
mand,  rather  than  by shifts  in labor  supply  (an  assumption  we find  highly 
plausible).  However, we realize that readers  may question  our identifi- 
cation restrictions.  Thus we pursue  two alternative  routes. 
Our  first method is to exploit cross sectional differences  in the joint 
behavior of employment, unemployment,  and wages in the data. The 
relative  importance  of migration  shocks surely  varies  across states;  they 
are more likely to be important  for border  states in the South than for 
states in the Midwest, for example. Thus we examine those border 
states separately  as we go along, looking  for systematic  differences.29 
27.  See Roback (1982) for a clear analysis of the joint long-run spatial equilibrium of 
local land and labor markets in a model with mobile firms and workers. 
28.  Krugman (1991). 
29.  A precursor paper, which exploits correlations between employment changes and 
wages  to  identify  the  role  of  supply  and demand  shocks  in  different  urban areas,  is 
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The second method  is to construct  observable  demand  shocks; trace 
their effects on employment,  unemployment,  and wages; and compare 
results. We shall construct and use two such series in the next-to-last 
section of this paper.  The first  series is defense spending,  which  we bor- 
row  from  Steven  Davis, Prakash  Loungani,  and  Ramamohan  Mahidhara 
and  which varies substantially  across time and across states.30  The sec- 
ond is a series constructed  and used by Timothy  Bartik;3'  it is obtained 
by constructing  for each state the growth of employment  that would 
have occurred  given the two-digit  sectoral  composition  of employment 
in the state, had each sector grown  at the national  growth  rate. This se- 
ries will be valid  for our  purposes  as long  as the national  growth  rates  are 
not correlated  with labor supply shocks in the state. This condition in 
turn will be true as long as a sector is not concentrated  in a particular 
state-a  condition  that is clearly satisfied  at the two-digit  level. 
Clearing Some Empirical Underbrush 
Before focusing on movements in relative employment, unemploy- 
ment, and so on, we take up two questions. First, how much  of the typi- 
cal movement in state employment is common to all states and how 
much  is state-specific?  Second, how much  do states differ  in their elas- 
ticity to common  shocks and how should  we therefore  define  state-spe- 
cific components? 
To answer these questions, we first  run the following regression  for 
each state: 
(7)  ANi,  =  (i  +  ?i  AN,  +  ?i, 
where  Nit  is the logarithm  of employment  in state i at time t (not  the loga- 
rithm  of relative  employment  in state i, which we denoted  ni, earlier),  N, 
is the logarithm of U.S.  employment  at time t, and Oi,  is a disturbance 
term. This equation  is estimated  using annual  data from 1948  to 1990. 
We also explored whether  lagged and led values of aggregate  employ- 
ment were significant  in equation  7. We found no evidence in favor of 
such a dynamic  specification  and  thus did not pursue  it further. 
30.  Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1991). 
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Table 2.  Regressions Relating State Employment Growth to National Employment 
Growth, 1948-90 
Region and state  Constant(cx)  Coefficient(3  ) 
NewX  Englanid 
Maine  - 0.0042  0.97  0.69 
New Hampshire  0.0031  1.04  0.53 
Vermont  0.0009  1.00  0.67 
Massachusetts  -0.0060  0.87  0.66 
Rhode Island  - 0.0145  1.12  0.68 
Connecticut  - 0.0078  1.18  0.77 
Middle  Atlantic 
New York  - 0.0049  0.66a  0.70 
New Jersey  -0.0002  0.89  0.82 
Pennsylvania  -0.0152  1.08  0.91 
East North Central 
Ohio  - 0.0163  1  40a  0.92 
Indiana  -0.0151  1.51a  0.84 
Illinois  - 0.0112  1.07  0.88 
Michigan  -0.0218  1.  72a  0.76 
Wisconsin  -0.0036  1.08  0.92 
West  Nor-th  Centrcal 
Minnesota  0.0026  0.99  0.85 
Iowa  - 0.0007  0.85  0.61 
Missouri  - 0.0045  0.99  0.89 
North Dakota  0.0203  0.14a  0.00 
South Dakota  0.0126  0.45a  0.23 
Nebraska  0.0072  0.61a  0.55 
Kansas  0.0040  0.82  0.52 
Solth  Atlantic 
Delaware  0.0048  1.01  0.56 
Maryland  0.0072  0.94  0.75 
District  of Columbia  -0.0017  0.48a  0.19 
Virginia  0.0115  0.90  0.72 
West Virginia  -0.0197  1.12  0.57 
North Carolina  0.0069  1.05  0.80 
South Carolina  0.0047  1.16  0.71 
Georgia  0.0088  1.08  0.83 
Florida  0.0304  0.90  0.44 
East  Soutth Central 
Kentucky  -0.0046  1.33a  0.82 
Tennesee  0.0015  1.15  0.81 
Alabama  0.0020  1.04  0.85 
Mississippi  0.0036  0.96  0.59 
West South Centr4al 
Arkansas  0.0068  0.96  0.62 
Louisiana  0.0078  0.71  0.28 
Oklahoma  0.0108  0.58a  0.24 
Texas  0.0149  0.82  0.47 Olivier Jean Blatnclar-d  and Lawrence F. Katz  27 
Table 2.  (Continued) 
Regioni  and state  Constant((x)  Coefficieit(p)  R2 
Moluntain 
Montana  0.0072  0.5 la  0.25 
Idaho  0.0104  0.76  0.29 
Wyoming  0.0116  0.55  0.06 
Colorado  0.0173  0.82  0.43 
New  Mexico  0.0252  0.50  0.16 
Arizona  0.0318  1.04  0.43 
Utah  0.0153  0.81  0.54 
Nevada  0.0352  1.02  0.28 
Pacific 
Washington  0.0038  1.09  0.57 
Oregon  -  0.0007  1.22  0.72 
California  0.0112  1.03  0.80 
Alaska  0.0771  -1.24a  0.13 
Hawaii  0.0299  0.34a  0.08 
Source:  Estimates  of the equation 
ANi,  +  PAN,  +  Oi,, 
where Ni, is the logarithm of employment  in state i at time t, and N, is the logarithm of national employment;  both 
are total establishment-based  nonagricultural employment  from E,nployment  anid Earnlinzgs.  Annual data from  1948 
to  1990 are used for all states  except  Alaska (1961-90)  and Hawaii (1956-90). 
a.  Significantly different from one at the 5 percent level. 
The results  of estimation  are reported  in table 2. The states are listed 
by Census  division. The adjusted  R2s  in the table  give an answer  to how 
much states move together  from year to year. The average  adjusted  R2 
is equal to 0.66. Thus much of the year-to-year  movement  in state em- 
ployment is accounted for by movements in aggregate  employment. 
Looking at differences  between states, a fairly clear pattern  emerges. 
Adjusted  R2s  are high for states with a traditional  manufacturing  base, 
such as those in the Middle  Atlantic  and East North Central  divisions; 
adjusted  R2s  often exceed 0.80, implying  that year-to-year  movements 
in those states are very much  dominated  by aggregate  movements. Ad- 
justed R2s are low for two types of states. The first, not very surpris- 
ingly, are farm  states such as North and South Dakota. The others are 
oil states, such as Alaska, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.  Leaving aside 
those two sets of states, the picture from year-to-year  movements is 
quite  different  from  that  given in  figure  2 earlier,  which showed  how over 
longer  periods  of time, state employment  trends  differ  from  the national 
average. 
The coefficients  on the log of aggregate  employment  in the table indi- 
cate how, for each state, state employment  moves with aggregate  em- 28  Br  ookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
ployment.  Here, obviously, the proper  weighted  average  is equal  to one; 
of interest is the distribution  of Ps across states. Thirteen states have 
elasticities significantly  different  from 1. On the high side are manufac- 
turing  states, producing  durables  such  as cars, which  have a high  elastic- 
ity with respect to aggregate  fluctuations.  This is the case for Michigan 
and Indiana,  which have elasticities of 1.72 and 1.51, respectively. On 
the low side (again,  not surprisingly)  are  farm  states  and  oil states:  North 
Dakota and South Dakota have elasticities of 0.14 and 0.45, respec- 
tively. From 1961  to 1990,  the period  for which  we have data,  Alaska  has 
an elasticity of  -  1.24! 
Within the context of equation 7, we also explored a number of 
hypotheses that regularly  surface in discussions of regional  fortunes. 
Given that we found little evidence in support  of these hypotheses, we 
shall  merely  summarize  these results  in words. 
A frequently  mentioned  hypothesis is that the share of tradables  in 
total production  has declined  over time and that states are thus less de- 
pendent  on aggregate  fluctuations.  We thus tested whether  the strength 
of the relation  between aggregate  employment  and state employment 
has declined over time. We did so by splitting  the sample  into pre-1970 
and  post-  1970  components  and  comparing  R2s  for the pre-  and  post-  1970 
samples  for each state. There  was no evidence of a decrease in  R2s. 
We explored  whether  the response  of state  employment  was different 
for some states with respect  to increases  and  decreases in aggregate  em- 
ployment. We found no such evidence, except for Alaska, where both 
decreases  and  increases  in aggregate  employment  were associated, dur- 
ing the sample period, with increases in employment  in Alaska. This 
clearly reflects  the fact that  Alaska  did well during  the two oil shock re- 
cessions. 
We explored  the idea  that  aggregate  recessions have stronger  adverse 
effects on those states that are already  experiencing  adverse idiosyn- 
cratic shocks. Such a hypothesis  has most recently  emerged  in connec- 
tion with the depth of the current  slump  in Massachusetts.  We thus al- 
lowed for a different effect of increases and decreases in aggregate 
employment  on state employment  and for the coefficients on those in- 
creases and  decreases  to depend  on the lagged  state  unemployment  rate. 
We found  no evidence in favor  of such a hypothesis-no  consistent  pat- 
tern in the coefficients on the interaction  terms over states or Census 
divisions. The effect is of the wrong sign and significant  for New Eng- Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  29 
land, of the right  sign  and significant  for Mountain  and  Pacific  divisions, 
and insignificant  elsewhere. 
The choice we face in the rest of the paper is whether to construct 
state-specific  variables  as simple  log differences,  or as (-differences, us- 
ing either  a common  set of estimated  Ps for all variables  or using  Ps esti- 
mated  for each variable  (employment  as above, unemployment,  wages, 
and so on). Given that for most states, an elasticity of 1 is not rejected 
by the data, we use simple  log differences  as measures  of state-specific 
or relative  variables  in the remainder  of the paper.  We have checked the 
robustness  of many  of our  results  using  (-differences, instead;  we found 
that  the results  were not very sensitive to the choice of simple  log differ- 
ences or (-differences. For example, the univariate  relative employ- 
ment processes examined  earlier  are quite similar  for simple  log differ- 
ences and  for (-differences using the estimated  Ps reported  in table  2. 
The final issue we consider in this section is that of the correlation 
of state-specific  movements  in employment  within Census divisions or 
regions. If most of the variation  in state relative employment move- 
ments  were common  to states in a Census  division,  then  not much  would 
be gained by working  with the 51 states individually,  rather  than with 
divisions  directly.  We thus  examined  the share  of the variation  in annual 
state relative  employment  changes that is common  to broader  regions. 
We ran  pooled  regressions  for the 51 states  for the 1948  to 1990  period  on 
a full set of region-year  interaction  dummy  variables  for regions  defined 
either  as Census division or region.  The regressions  indicate  that about 
38 percent  of annual  state relative  employment  variation  is common  to 
Census  divisions  and  about  26  percent  is common  to Census  regions.  We 
conclude  from these regressions  that the majority  of state employment 
variation  is idiosyncratic  (after  accounting  for common national  fluctu- 
ations) and that examining  individual  states is a fruitful  approach.  We 
now turn  to characterizing  state-specific  fluctuations. 
Employment,  Unemployment,  and Participation 
Our  model implies  and the evidence supports  the notion that trends 
in employment  do not lead to trends  in unemployment.  However, a cor- 
relation  may exist between employment  trends  and average  unemploy- 
ment rates. We first  briefly  examine whether  such a correlation  exists; 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
no clear pattern  emerges. We then turn to the characterization  of the 
joint fluctuations  of employment,  unemployment,  and  participation. 
Average  Unemployment  and Employment  Growth Rates 
In our model the correlation  between mean  unemployment  rates and 
employment  growth  rates  depends  on the relative  importance  of the un- 
derlying  sources of growth. It implies that if growth  comes from labor 
demand, a negative correlation  should occur between average unem- 
ployment  and employment  growth;  the opposite should hold if growth 
comes from labor  supply  caused by workers'  migration.  As we pointed 
out already,  our model is likely to be too simple  here. Clearly,  the equi- 
librium  level of unemployment  also depends  on the industrial  composi- 
tion of nonfarm  production  and  on the share  of agricultural  employment. 
Clearly  also, richer and more realistic formalizations  of migration  be- 
havior  may lead to "wait unemployment,"  and  thus to a positive corre- 
lation between unemployment  and employment  growth  even when de- 
mand  trends  dominate:  workers  may prefer  to be unemployed  in a state 
in which many vacancies occur and high wages prevail, because work- 
ers' expected future earnings would be higher at any unemployment 
rate.32 
The evidence is given in figure  6, which  plots average  unemployment 
rates versus employment  growth  rates  for the period 1970-90.'No  clear 
pattern  emerges.  The slope of the regression  line is equal  to - 0.06, with 
a t statistic  of 0.04. The clustering  of some states is of interest. The low 
employment  growth states of the Rust Belt have high unemployment 
rates.  Three  out of the four  states  with  very high  growth  rates-Arizona, 
Florida, and Nevada-have  unemployment  rates close to the national 
mean. The farm  states have low unemployment  rates. While  one could 
explore those relations  further,  we do not. Instead, we turn  to the dy- 
namic  effects of shocks. 
Dynamic  Responses 
Our model points out that two adjustment  mechanisms  come into 
play in response to an adverse shock in demand. Lower wages induce 
32.  This line of reasoning traces back to the Harris-Todaro model of unemployment 
and has recently been explored under the heading of wait unemployment. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Law)rence  F. Katz  31 
Figure 6.  Average Unemployment Rates and Employment Growth across U.S.  States, 
1970-90 
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net in-migration  of firms and the creation of jobs. Lower wages and 
higher  unemployment  induce net out-migration  of labor. The long-run 
effect on employment  depends  on the relative  strength  and speed of the 
two effects. We now explore the strengths  of these two mechanisms  by 
tracing  the effects of an innovation  in employment  on employment,  un- 
employment,  and  participation. 
More  formally,  we estimate,  for each state, a log linear  system in the 
following  three  variables.  The first, which we denote \ei, is the first  dif- 
ference of the logarithm  of employment  in state i minus the first  differ- 
ence of the logarithm  of U.S. aggregate  employment.  The second, de- 
noted  lei, is equal  to the logarithm  of the ratio  of employment  to the labor 
force in state i minus  the same  variable  for the entire  United States. The 
third,  denoted  Ipi, is equal  to the logarithm  of the ratio  of the labor  force 
to the working  age population  in state  i deviated  from  the U.S. aggregate 
for  the same  variable.  (See the appendix  for exact definitions.)  The three 
variables  appear  to be stationary.  Given the behavior  of these log vari- 
ables, we can then easily characterize  the behavior of other variables 32  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
such as the unemployment  rate  and  the participation  rate, or changes  in 
the numbers of workers employed, unemployed, or out of the labor 
force.33  We estimate 
eit=  otilO  +  xi,  I (L) A  1ei,t-  I+  0ti12  (L) lei,t-  I +  (Xic3  (L) lip t  - I  +  f iet 
=  ?i2O  +  0Xi21 (L)  \eit  +  oi22  (L) lei,t-  +  Oti23  (L) 1pipt-  I+  Ei,t, 
Pit  =t  i3O  +  ti31  (L) Aeit +  Oi32 (L) lei,t-  1  +  Ot33 (L) 'Pi,t- 1  +  Eipt 
We allow for two lags for each variable.  Our  approach  to estimating 
this and  other  systems below is to first  estimate  them  separately  for each 
state, then  to do pooled estimation,  first  by pooling  states within  Census 
divisions, then by pooling all states together, allowing  in each case for 
state-fixed  effects-that  is, state-specific  constant terms in each equa- 
tion. This gives a sense of both commonalities  and differences  across 
states.34  In some cases, however, the time dimension is too small to 
allow for reliable  estimation  for each state. This is the case here. Our 
estimation  period  is limited  by the unavailability  of information  on labor 
force participation  rates  from the Current  Population  Survey (CPS)  for 
most states prior  to 1976.  Since we include  two lags of each variable,  we 
can estimate  the system only over the 1978  to 1990  period.  In such  cases, 
we perform  our estimates  only at the Census division  and U.S. national 
levels.3 
Our  specification  of the lag structure,  allowing  for current  changes  in 
\eit  to affect current values  of leit  and Ipit,  but not vice  versa,  and our 
33.  The unemployment and participation rates are obtained for example using the rela- 
tions d(U/L) =(E/L)(dln(L/E))  and d(L/P)  =  (L/P)(dln(L/P)),  where  U, L, E, and P are 
unemployment,  the labor force, employment,  and working age population, respectively. 
The mean value for the sample of EIL is 0.936; for LIP, it is 0.655. 
34.  We also have experimented with alternative weighting schemes in our estimates of 
models pooled  across groups of states.  We have run unweighted ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions  and regressions  in which observations  for each state are weighted by 
the level of state employment or population in a base year. Although our unit of observa- 
tion is a state, one might worry that unweighted OLS results place too much emphasis on 
small states relative to their importance to the national economy.  Because it turns out that 
our estimates  are rather insensitive  to whether we do or do not weight by some measure 
of state size, we report only estimates of the unweighted models. 
35.  We also have estimated the bivariate system in the first two variables, dropping the 
third; this requires only data on unemployment  and employment  and allows estimation 
using data from 1970 to 1990. The estimated impulse responses for employment and unem- 
ployment from the bivariate system are nearly identical to those estimated from the trivari- 
ate system. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  33 
Figure 7.  Response of Employment, Unemployment, and Labor Force Participation 
to an Employment Shock 
Effect of shock (percent) 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on the system  of equations  described  in the text,  using data described  in the 
appendix.  All 51 states  are used  in the estimation.  The  shock  is a  -  I percent  shock  to employment.  Bands of one 
standard error are shown  around each line. 
interpretation  Of E,e as an innovation  to labor  demand  reflect  the identifi- 
cation assumption discussed earlier, namely that unexpected move- 
ments  in employment  within  the year  primarily  reflect  movements  in la- 
bor demand. Under this assumption,  tracing  the effects of Eie gives us 
the dynamic  effects of an innovation  in labor demand  on employment, 
unemployment,  and the labor force. We now report  these impulse re- 
sponses. 
While  some differences  across various  state  groupings  exist (to which 
we return  below), responses  are  largely  similar.  The responses  of the un- 
employment  rate, the participation  rate, and log employment  to an ad- 
verse shock-a  negative unit shock to log relative employment-using 
all  51 states  are  plotted  in figure  7. In the first  year, a decrease  in employ- 
ment  of 1  percent  is reflected  in an increase  in the unemployment  rate  of 
0.32 percentage  points and a decrease in the participation  rate of 0.17 
percentage  points. Over time, the effect on employment  builds up, to 34  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
reach a peak of - 2.0 percent after four years and a plateau of about 
-  1.3 percent. The effects on unemployment  and participation  steadily 
decline and disappear  after  five to seven years.36 
Instead  of reporting  results  in terms  of changes  in unemployment  and 
participation  rates, we can report  them in terms of changes in numbers 
of workers.  A decrease in employment  of 1 worker  in the initial  year is 
associated  with  an increase  in unemployment  of 0.3 workers,  a decrease 
in participation  of 0.05 workers,  and  thus an implied  increase  in net out- 
migration  of 0.65  workers.37  The substantial  role  played  by net migration 
even in the first  year of a shock is similar  to the findings  of Susan  House- 
man and Katharine  Abraham  for state-level data in models that ignore 
the dynamic  effects of shocks.38  By five to seven years, the employment 
response  consists entirely  of the migration  of workers.39 
Okun's Coefficients  and Shocks  to Labor Demand  and Supply 
As we discussed earlier,  comparisons  across states give us a way of 
informally  checking our identification  assumption. Border states are 
36.  In general, our results are consistent  with previous studies, as summarized in Bar- 
tik (1991). Our conclusions  differ somewhat from Bartik's, who, using data from MSAs, 
concludes  that employment  shocks  have a small but nonzero,  hysteretic  effect on unem- 
ployment. While hysteresis  is an idea we sometimes like, we find the conclusion implausi- 
ble in this case.  The result that positive  state relative employment  shocks  permanently 
affect state relative unemployment is difficult to reconcile with the lack of a clear relation 
between  average employment  growth and unemployment  rates for U.S.  states over our 
sample period. 
37.  This may be an overestimate  of the initial contribution of migration to adjustment 
because  we are using establishment  data on employment.  Part of the initial employment 
response  may reflect changes in dual job holding. Changes in the rate of dual job holding 
will alter the level of employment  as measured in the establishment  survey,  but will not 
affect the number of unemployed and nonparticipants measured in the household survey. 
The implied initial migration response to an employment shock is somewhat smaller (0.40 
as opposed to 0.65 of the initial adjustment) when we estimate our trivariate system using 
CPS household employment  data, rather than establishment  data. However,  the implied 
relative importance of migration is quite similar within several years after a shock. 
38.  Houseman and Abraham (1990). 
39.  The lack of a permanent effect of employment shocks on the participation rate does 
not rule out the possibility that some workers both do not migrate and permanently drop 
out of the labor force in response  to an adverse demand shock.  For example,  part of the 
observed initial reduction in the participation rate from an adverse shock may reflect older 
workers who take early retirement and permanently drop out of the labor force.  The lack 
of a participation response  by seven  years after the shock  indicates  that these  workers 
would have retired anyway by that time, even without an adverse shock. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  35 
likely to have a larger variance of migration  shocks than nonborder 
states. While shocks to labor demand  are likely to generate  a negative 
contemporaneous  correlation  of employment and unemployment  re- 
sponses, migration  shocks are  likely  instead  to generate  a positive corre- 
lation  between the two. Thus if migration  shocks are quantitatively  im- 
portant  for  border  states and  if migration  shocks show up in employment 
within  the year, one would expect the estimated  response of unemploy- 
ment  to employment  to be closer to zero, or even to be positive if supply 
shocks dominate. Thus we estimate separately  the response of unem- 
ployment  and employment  for border  states (Arizona,  California,  Flor- 
ida, New Mexico, New York, and  Texas) on the one hand,  and  all other 
states on the other. The two sets of responses are plotted  in figure  8 and 
are surprisingly  similar.  This suggests  that  even in the border  states, mi- 
gration  shocks account for a small proportion  of year-to-year  employ- 
ment movements and/or that migration  shocks are only partially re- 
flected  in changes  in establishment  (nonagricultural)  employment  within 
the year.40  Similarly  distinguishing  between  farm  and  nonfarm  states, or 
oil and  nonoil states, does not yield obvious differences. 
Going beyond the narrow  question  of identification,  are there states 
where  the "Okun  coefficient"-the negative  of the ratio  of the response 
of unemployment  to employment-is  substantially  lower than the na- 
tional  average?41  To answer  this question, we examine  the Okun  coeffi- 
cients implied  by the estimates  of the trivariate  system from 1978  to 1990 
for individual  states and for groups of states (in systems with fixed ef- 
fects for each state). Keep in mind  that when estimating  state by state, 
we have very few degrees of freedom. The estimated  Okun  coefficient 
is closer to zero in the farm  states ( - 0.22 with a t statistic  of 8.1) than  in 
the typical state ( - 0.32 with a t statistic of 17.5 in a regression  pooled 
across  all states). In estimates  for individual  states, we find  the Okun  co- 
efficient  to be quite  low for Mississippi  (-  0.01), Nebraska  (-  0.09), and 
Arizona  (-  0.14). It is of the wrong  sign in Tennessee (0.01), California 
(0.02), Montana  (0.04), Colorado  (0.05), South Carolina  (0.06), Minne- 
40.  However,  the results vary across individual border states.  As we indicate below, 
two states, Arizona and California, have estimated positive effects  of employment on un- 
employment, suggesting the importance of migration shocks. 
41.  The use of the expression  "Okun coefficient"  is not quite correct because  Okun 
introduced  his coefficient  to  characterize  the  relation between  changes  in output  and 
changes in unemployment. See Okun (1962). 36  Br  ookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 8.  Response of Employment, Unemployment, and Labor Force Participation 
to an Employment Shock: Border and Nonborder States 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Border states are Arizona,  California, Florida, New  Mexico,  New  York, and Texas. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Lawrence  F. Katz  37 
sota (0.27), and Kansas (0.59). We guess that the reasons differ  across 
those cases. In farm states, labor must move in and out of agriculture. 
In Arizona  and California,  exogenous migration  may be important.  We 
will not attempt  to explain  the other  outliers. 
Employment, Nominal Wages, and Consumption  Wages 
The main  finding  of the previous  section-that  most of the adjustment 
to an adverse shock of employment  is through  out-migration  of labor 
rather  than  through  the in-migration  and  creation  ofjobs-may  have two 
explanations.  It may be that the adverse shock does not affect relative 
wages very much, thus providing  weak incentives for  job creation. Or 
it may be that relative  wages indeed decline substantially,  but that this 
decline does not trigger  a large enough  job creation. We now focus on 
this part of the adjustment  process by examining  the joint behavior  of 
employment,  unemployment,  and wages. Before doing so, we briefly 
examine  the relation  between average  relative  wage levels and employ- 
ment  growth. 
Employment Growth,  Unemployment,  and  Wages 
In our simple  model, correlations  among  average  growth  rates, aver- 
age unemployment  rates, and  average  wages can tell us about  the proxi- 
mate sources of growth, the drift  terms in our model. If states grow at 
different  rates because they are differentially  attractive  to firms-that 
is, if they differ  primarily  in the value of Xdi -then  high growth  will be 
associated  with  low unemployment  and  high  wages. If instead  they grow 
at different  rates  because they are differentially  attractive  to workers- 
if they differ  primarily  in the value of xs,-then high  growth  will be asso- 
ciated with high unemployment  and low wages. As we have already 
pointed  out, these predictions  are not very robust:  differences  in the rel- 
ative price of consumption  across states, unmeasured  amenities, and 
wait unemployment  can all reverse those correlations.  Nevertheless, it 
is tempting  to look at those correlations  and to see whether a pattern 
emerges. 
We do so in figures  9 and 10.  Both  figures  use average  hourly  earnings 
in manufacturing  as a measure of wages. Figure 9 covers the period 38  Brookings Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 9.  Employment Growth and Wages across U.S.  States,  1950-90 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data described  in the appendix.  Annual employment  growth is measured  by 
the average annual change  in log employment. 
1950-90; because consistent unemployment  rates are available only 
since 1970,  figure  10  covers the period  1970-90.  The correlation  between 
average  employment  growth  and  relative  wages is roughly  equal  to zero. 
In a regression, the estimated slope is - 0.68, with a t statistic of only 
0.6. Using personal  income per capita, the measure  used by Barro  and 
Sala-i-Martin,  yields similar  results. The correlation  between average 
unemployment  rates  and  wages is positive, a fact emphasized  by Robert 
Hall  in the early 1970s.42  In a regression,  the coefficient  is positive, with 
a t statistic of 3. 1, and the R2 is 0.16. But, more recently, others have 
shown that  this correlation  is sensitive to the exact period  used.43  Thus, 
the simple conclusion from this brief examination  is that no pattern 
emerges, and that differences in long-term  growth rates across states 
42.  See Hall (1970). 
43.  See, for example,  Blanchflower and Oswald (1991) and Katz and Krueger (1991). Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Lawrence  F. Katz  39 
Figure 10.  Average Unemployment Rates and Wages across U.S.  States,  1970-90 
Average  manufacturing wage (dollars per hour) 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  using data described  in the appendix. 
cannot  be easily ascribed  to a single  dominant  cause, such as workers  or 
firms  wanting  to move to the sunnier  climates  of the South and Califor- 
nia. We leave it at that  and  return  to the study of dynamics. 
Dynamic Responses  of Employment  and  Wages 
To trace the effects of a shock in labor  demand  on employment  and 
wages, we follow the same strategy  as earlier.  We estimate  a system in 
employment  and wages; identify the innovation in employment as a 
shock  to labor  demand;  and  trace  its dynamic  effects. More  formally,  for 
each state i, we estimate 
eit=  otilO +  otill (L) z\ei,-  +  Otil2  (L)  li,t-1  +  'iet; 
Wit=  ti2O +  Oti21 (L) leit  +  Oi22  (L) "i ,- I +  Filt; 
where leit is, as before, the first  difference  of the logarithm  of employ- 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 11.  Response of Employment and Manufacturing Wages to an Employment 
Shock 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown  around each  line. 
ment in state i at time t minus  its national  counterpart;  wit  is the differ- 
ence between  the logarithm  of average  hourly  earnings  in manufacturing 
in state i at time t and  its national  counterpart.  We use four  lags for each 
of the variables  and estimate the system over the period 1952-90. We 
leave out unemployment  and participation,  not on theoretical  grounds, 
but because including  them would reduce  the size of the sample  and in- 
troduce  additional  right-hand-side  variables,  leading  to too few degrees 
of freedom.  Figure  11  gives the  joint response  of employment  and  wages 
to a negative  innovation  in employment,  from pooled estimation  using 
all states and allowing  for state fixed effects. The picture  is clear. First, 
the employment  response is close to those obtained earlier, with em- 
ployment  decreasing  to 1.7 times its initial  response, to eventually  pla- 
teau at -  1.2 percent. Wages decrease, reaching  a minimum  after six 
years and then returning  to zero slowly over time. Putting  together  the 
results from figures  7 and 11, an initial negative shock of 1 percent to 
employment  increases the unemployment  rate by up to 0.37 percent  af- 
ter two years and decreases wages by up to 0.4 percent after about six Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  41 
Figure 12.  Response of Employment and Adjusted Wages to an Employment Shock 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown  around each line. 
years, thus  implying  an elasticity  of relative  wages to relative  unemploy- 
ment  of approximately  unity.44 
While  the manufacturing  wage is the only wage series available  con- 
sistently  for the last 40 years, there are reasons to think  that  it may be a 
mediocre  proxy  for movements  in overall  wages in a state. Thus  we have 
constructed  another  wage series for the period 1979-89, by using CPS 
data to construct  a wage for each state and each year controlling  for a 
number  of industry  and workers characteristics.  (The details of con- 
struction appear in the appendix.) Figure 12 gives the dynamic re- 
sponses of employment  when we use that wage instead  of the manufac- 
turing  wage, doing panel data estimation  allowing  for state effects. In 
this case, the time  dimension  is short  so that  even when we use only two 
lags on each variable, we have only six degrees of freedom for each 
state. Thus while the pooling  of all states gives us substantial  informa- 
tion at short  horizons, our estimated  responses are unlikely  to be accu- 
44. These findings  are consistent  with the general  wisdom  from  past research.  For a 
survey  of earlier  research  and  extensions,  see Bartik  (1991). 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
rate  at long horizons. Over  the first  five years or so, the results  are quite 
similar  to those obtained  using the manufacturing  wage. In response to 
an initial  employment  decrease  of 1  percent,  the relative  wage  decreases 
by about  0.5 percent  and  increases slowly later. Employment  decreases 
by 1.7 percent after three years, but then employment  appears  to re- 
cover much more substantially  than when we use the manufacturing 
wage. The differences  in results for estimates using these two distinct 
wage series do not appear to arise from different sample periods. 
Reestimating  the dynamics of employment and manufacturing  wages 
over the same sample as for CPS wages gives a figure  similar  to figure 
1  1, not to figure  12.  We are  not sure  of how seriously  to take  those differ- 
ences. On the one hand, nonmanufacturing  wages may have a stronger 
effect on job creation;  this may be what is captured  here. On the other 
hand, most of the information  comes from the cross section aspect of 
the data, not the very short time series dimension. Finally, the results 
reported  below using  personal  income, a variable  that  includes  the wage 
bill and  thus covers all wages-and  unfortunately  more-coincide  more 
closely with results  using  manufacturing  wages rather  than  CPS wages. 
Figure  13  plots the estimates  the effects of a unit  adverse  employment 
innovation  on employment  and  personal  income  per capita  (the variable 
used by Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  rather  than  wages).45  The period  of esti- 
mation  is 1952-90  and  we use four  lags for each variable.  The results  are 
consistent with those obtained using employment  and manufacturing 
wages. Personal  income  decreases  more  than  wages, reflecting  the addi- 
tional effects of the decrease in profit  income and of increased  unem- 
ployment.  It decreases  by 0.9 percent  after  two years  and  returns  slowly 
to zero over time. 
In contrast  to the earlier  results  on unemployment  and employment, 
fairly clear differences  in the dynamic  response of wages occur across 
states. New England  states generally  exhibit the strongest  response of 
wages and  personal  income  to employment.  Traditional  heavy manufac- 
turing  states exhibit  the least response. Indeed,  for the East North Cen- 
tral  division, which  includes  most of those states, the response  of manu- 
facturing  wages to employment  growth  is negative. One can think  of a 
number  of composition  effects such as reverse seniority  at work. Our 
CPS measure  has larger  coverage and, given the controls, is less likely 
45.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrenice  F. Katz  43 
Figure 13.  Response of Employment and Per Capita Income to an Employment Shock 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown around each line. 
to exhibit  such bias. The response  of CPS wages to employment  growth 
for the East North Central  division is weakly positive, smaller  than the 
estimated  national  response in figure 12. The response of personal in- 
come is also positive, but again  smaller  than  the national  average. 
Suppressing  the Effects  of  Wages 
Having  estimated  the equations  above, it is hard  to resist asking  what 
the effects of wage adjustments  are on employment  or how much they 
dampen  the employment  response to a labor  demand  shock. To answer 
these questions, we recompute  our responses from the estimated sys- 
tem, but  set all the coefficients  on lagged  wages in the employment  equa- 
tion, UM12(L),  equal  to zero. We do so using the estimated  system in em- 
ployment and manufacturing  wages above. In figure 14, we plot the 
response  of employment  with  and  without  wage  feedback. For  our  inter- 
pretation  of those two responses to be correct, two conditions  must be 
met. The first, which we made above to interpret  impulse  responses in 44  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
Figure 14.  Response of Employment to an Employment Shock, with and without Wage 
Feedback 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown around each line. 
the first  place, is that labor  demand  does not respond  to current  wages. 
The second, subject  to an  obvious and  probably  relevant  Lucas critique, 
is that the labor  demand  function  would remain  unchanged  were wages 
not to adjust.  With  those caveats in mind,  the message from  figure  14  is 
fairly clear: the adjustment  of wages dampens the employment re- 
sponse, but by relatively  little. Absent feedback from wages, employ- 
ment  would  end at 1.6  times its initial  change,  compared  to 1.2  with  wage 
feedback. This evidence is suggestive of a weak effect of wages on job 
creation  and  job in-migration.46 
Nominal  versus Consumption  Wages 
We now focus on relative consumption  wages, rather  than nominal 
wages. The incentives of workers  to migrate  in or out of a state depend 
46. One caveat is needed here, following  up on earlier  results. Had we used our  esti- 
mates  from  estimation  using  CPS  wages, the estimated  feedback  would  be much  stronger. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  45 
on relative consumption  wages, rather  than on nominal  wages. How- 
ever, there  are  no consumption  price  indexes available  at the state  level. 
Thus  we must  rely  on price  indexes  for cities and  assume  that  those price 
indexes are  good proxies  for state  price  indexes. For that  reason,  we see 
the results  below as more  tentative  than  those presented  so far. We use 
two alternative  price series, housing  prices and consumer  price indexes 
(CPI). 
Median  sales prices  for existing  houses exist for 39 metropolitan  sta- 
tistical  areas  (MSAs);  these data  are  available  at most  from 1969  to 1990, 
and usually for shorter periods.47  We construct the relative housing 
price for MSA i at time t, which we denote phi,, as the logarithm  of the 
median  sales price of existing houses in that MSA minus  the logarithm 
of the national  median  price. Our employment  growth series for each 
MSA is the employment  growth  series of the state in which the central 
city in the MSA is located. We then  run  a bivariate  system pooled across 
the 39 MSAs, allowing  for MSA fixed effects: 
\eit  =  otilO +  till  (L) Aei,t-  +  oil2  (L) phit-  +  Eiet; 
P  =  hti2O  +  -i2l  (L)  eit  +  ?ti22  (L) phit-I  +  Eipt 
Figure  15  gives the estimated  joint response  of employment  and  hous- 
ing prices to a negative  innovation  in employment.  The response  of em- 
ployment is very much the same as before. The response of housing 
prices is striking.  In response to the decrease in employment,  relative 
housing  prices  decrease steadily  to reach  a trough  of 2 percent  after  four 
to five years, and  then return  to their  previous  level over time. This sug- 
gests a housing  market  in which some owners must sell during  troughs, 
leading  to a decrease  in prices, followed by a predictable  increase  as un- 
employment  returns  to normal  and the supply  of housing  adjusts  to the 
change  in population.  These dynamics  have three  relevant  implications. 
First, and obviously, this impulse response implies predictable  but 
relatively  small  excess returns.  In response to an initial  unexpected  de- 
cline in employment  of 2 percent-a  two-standard  deviation shock to 
employment-house prices are expected to further  decline at roughly  1 
percent  per year  for the next three  years, and  then to recover  at a rate  of 
roughly  0.4 percent  for the following  five years. Given  the need  for many 
47.  These  data were given  to us by Jim Poterba and are used in his paper, Poterba 
(1991), which deals with related issues. 46  Br-ookings  Paper-s on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 15.  Response of Employment and City House Prices to an Employment Shock 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown around each  line. 
workers  to sell their  house when they move and the size of transaction 
costs in the housing  market,  these predictable  excess returns  are  not im- 
plausible. 
Second, while the effects of the shock  on employment  are  largely  per- 
manent,  the long-run  effects of relative  housing  prices appear  not to be. 
This implicitly  requires  a flat  long-run  supply  of land in each MSA. Be- 
cause of the quality  of the data and the short span  of the time series we 
use, we do not want  to emphasize  this result  too much. We nevertheless 
want  to flag  it for further  work.4 
Finally, putting  our results on wages and housing  prices together, in 
response to a decrease in employment  of 1 percent, nominal  wages de- 
crease to a trough  of about - 0.5 percent,  while housing  prices decrease 
to a trough  at about - 2 percent.  Thus assuming  a share  of housing  ser- 
48.  Bartik (1991) finds a similar hump shape pattern of the response  of MSA housing 
prices to employment  shocks.  Bartik concludes  from his analysis that some evidence  ex- 
ists that employment shocks have small permanent effects on house prices. Oliv'ier  Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  47 
vices of 15  percent  and  ignoring  the fact that  the price  of other  nontrada- 
bles probably  also goes down, consumption  wages decrease only by 
about 0.2 percent, or 40 percent  of the decrease in nominal  wages. For 
both renters  and  house owners, the drop  in prices reduces incentives to 
migrate, but through different channels. In response to an adverse 
shock, rents  are  likely to decrease  with house prices, dampening  the de- 
cline in renters'  consumption  wages, and thus the incentive for renters 
to migrate.  For owners, on the other  hand,  lower housing  prices mean  a 
capital loss; if they expect housing prices to pick up again when eco- 
nomic  conditions  improve  (and  our  evidence, as well as James  Poterba's 
evidence suggests that  this may be rational),  those workers  may decide 
to stay rather  than  to leave and  realize  a loss.49 
We can directly look at the behavior  of local CPIs for the 23 MSAs 
for which they are available  for a reasonably  long time period.  Thus we 
construct  the relative  consumer  price  at time  t for  MSA i as the logarithm 
of the CPI  for MSA i at time t minus  the logarithm  of the national  coun- 
terpart.  We then  estimate  a bivariate  system in relative  consumer  prices 
and  employment  growth  analogous  to the one above for the 1968-88  pe- 
riod. The implied impulse responses of consumer prices and employ- 
ment to a unit shock to employment  are given in figure 16. Consumer 
prices respond slowly to a shock to employment and eventually de- 
crease by 0.38 percent  after six years in response to an initial 1 percent 
decrease  in employment.  The effect on local prices  slowly dissipates  and 
is essentially  gone after 15  years or so. These responses of overall  local 
prices  are  fairly  consistent  with  house price  changes  playing  the key role 
in changes  in local prices.50 
Altogether,  our results imply a small response of real consumption 
wages in response  to relative  shocks to employment.  These findings  re- 
inforce  our  view that  unemployment  rather  than  relative  wages explains 
the adjustment  of the local labor  force to changes  in labor  market  condi- 
tions. A strong  response of migration  to changes in unemployment  and 
weak sensitivity to wage differentials  is consistent with slow conver- 
gence of wages and  income  per capita  across states and the evidence on 
49.  Poterba(1991). 
50.  We report these results with some hesitation. While results from pooled estimation 
are sensible,  results vary substantially across  subsets  of MSAs.  For example,  for MSAs 
in the East region, we find a negative contemporaneous  effect of employment innovations 
on CPIs. 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
Figure 16.  Response of Employment and City Consumer Prices to an Employment 
Shock 
Effect  of shock  (percent) 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -I  percent  shock  to 
employment.  Bands of one  standard error are shown  around each line. 
the weak effect  of wage differentials on decadal migration rates found 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin.51 
The Effects  of Observable  Demand  Shocks 
Throughout this paper, we  have associated  innovations  in employ- 
ment with innovations in labor demand. In this section,  we take the al- 
ternative course of relying on observable shifts in demand. To this end, 
we  construct  two  variables.  Both  are plausibly  exogenous  and move 
enough to have a noticeable effect on labor demand. 
The first is defense  spending, or more precisely the real value of mili- 
tary prime contract awards by state,  a variable that has been used by 
Davis,  Loungani, and Mahidhara in a related context  (see appendix for 
51.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Olivier Jean Blanchar-d  and Lawrence F. Katz  49 
details of construction).52  It exhibits substantial movements across 
states and  time. On average,  from 1951  to 1988  (the period  for which we 
can construct  the series) it accounts for more  than  6 percent  of state in- 
come for  four  states-California, Connecticut,  Massachusetts,  and  Mis- 
souri-and  the District of Columbia.  For those states and the District, 
the standard  deviation  of forecast errors  from a simple  univariate  proc- 
ess is on average equal to 14 percent; some forecast errors  exceed 30 
percent. 
The second variable is a mix variable that gives the employment 
growth  in a state predicted  by the growth  of its industries  nationally;  it 
has been constructed  and used by Bartik  in a similar  context.53  The se- 
ries is generated  for each state and each year, from 1970  to 1989, as a 
weighted  average  of the growth  rates of national  industry  employment 
(aggregated  to two-digit  SIC categories)  with the weights calculated  as 
the previous  year share  of state employment  in each industry.  This vari- 
able  will be a valid  instrument  in a given state if industry  national  growth 
rates  are uncorrelated  with labor  supply  shocks in the state. This in turn 
will be true  if sectoral  employment  at the two-digit  level is not too con- 
centrated  in any state, a condition  that  appears  satisfied  in the data. Be- 
cause  we shall  use the deviation  of this variable  from  the national  growth 
rate  of employment,  this deviation  will be a good instrument  if states dif- 
fer sufficiently  in their sectoral employment  composition. This condi- 
tion also appears  to be satisfied. 
In a previous section, we characterized  the joint movement in em- 
ployment  and  unemployment  traced  by an innovation  in employment.54 
Under  our identifying  assumptions,  this innovation  reflected  only labor 
demand  shocks. The question we ask here is whether the relation  be- 
tween employment  and unemployment  traced by each of our two ob- 
servable variables  is indeed similar  to that characterized  before.55  To 
that  end, we specify the following  equation: 
leit =  ?tio  +  o-il(L)  Aeit +  Oli2 (L) leit  I +  E:il( 
52.  Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1991). 
53.  Bartik (1991). 
54.  We shall ignore participation here. 
55.  One could clearly do more, such as tracing the effects  of each of the two variables 
on employment, unemployment, wages, and so on. To some extent, this has been done by 
the authors cited above.  But our focus here is in potentially validating our earlier identifi- 
cation assumption; we limit ourselves  to that here. 50  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
where leit  is the logarithm of the ratio of employment to the labor force 
minus  its national  counterpart.  (We use this variable  rather  than  the un- 
employment  rate itself to remain  consistent with our earlier specifica- 
tion.)  The first  difference  of the logarithm  of employment  in state i minus 
its national  counterpart  is leit,  and  cxil(L)  and  CXi2 (L)  are distributed  lags. 
Under the assumption that employment innovations reflect only 
shocks to labor  demand,  current  employment  changes  are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance  term and this equation  can be estimated  by ordi- 
nary least squares  (OLS). But, for example, if migration  shocks affect 
both unemployment  and employment  within the year, then the coeffi- 
cient on current  employment  is likely to be biased. However, in that 
case, we can use our  observable  demand  variables  as instruments.  Thus 
we estimate  the equation  three  ways: by OLS;  by instrumental  variables 
(IV), using current  and lagged  values of the defense spending  as instru- 
ments  for current  employment;  and  by IV, using  current  and  lagged  val- 
ues of the mix as instruments  for current  employment. 
We pool all states and  allow  for state effects. Because the equation  to 
be estimated  is loglinear  while the relation  between real spending  and 
employment  is linear, we define the spending  variable  as git =  (Di t-  I/ 
Eit  - ,) ln Dit -  (Dt- I/Et_  I) ln Dt, where Dit  is real defense spending  for 
state i at time t; Dt is real U.S. defense spending  at time t; and  Eit  and  Et 
are state i and U.S. employment,  respectively. This specification  of the 
defense instrument  is consistent with an underlying  linear  relation  be- 
tween spending  and employment.  We defined  the mix variable  above. 
We allow for four lags of Aei  and two lags of lei. The sample  period  for 
estimation  is 1972-88  for the ten largest  industrial  states and 1978-1988 
for the remaining  states. 
The results are summarized  in figure  17, which gives the dynamic  ef- 
fects of an adverse unit employment  shock on the unemployment  rate 
implied  by estimation  of the equation  in the three different  cases.56  Of 
particular  interest  is the response of unemployment  to current  changes 
in employment, Okun's coefficient. Consistent with what we would 
have expected if employment  changes  in part  reflected  migration  and  la- 
bor supply shocks, the coefficient  of the current  employment  shock in 
56.  More formally,  figure 17 plots,  for each case,  the coefficients  of the polynomial 
[1 -  cOi2  (L)L]  - loxil(L) multiplied by -  0.932 (the average employment rate over the sample) 
to convert the implied changes in the log employment  rate (le) into changes in the unem- 
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Figure 17.  Response of Unemployment to an Employment Shock, Ordinary Least 
Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  data  described  in  the  appendix.  The  shock  is  a  -  I  percent  shock  to 
employment. 
the unemployment equation is slightly larger when we use the industry- 
mix instrument than when we use OLS.  On the other hand, the coeffi- 
cient is slightly smaller when we use the military contracts instrument. 
Overall, the shapes of the estimated  response  of unemployment  to an 
employment shock are rather similar for all three approaches,  although 
the two instrumental variables approaches lead to substantially less pre- 
cise estimates.  We see these results as providing support for our identi- 
fication assumptions. 
Conclusion 
Over the postwar period, some U.S.  states have consistently  grown 
faster than the national average, while some have grown more slowly. 
Booms  and slumps for states are best described as transitory accelera- 
tions or slowdowns  of employment growth. Growth eventually  returns 52  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1992 
to normal,  but the path of employment  is permanently  affected. These 
transitory  changes in growth lead to transitory  fluctuations  in relative 
unemployment  and wages. The dominant  adjustment  mechanism  is la- 
bor mobility,  rather  than  job creation  or  job migration.  Labor  mobility, 
in turn,  appears  to be primarily  a response  to changes  in unemployment, 
rather  than  in consumption  wages. 
The Case  of Massachusetts 
It is in this  light  that  one must  view the travails  of Massachusetts  since 
the early 1980s. Over the postwar period, Massachusetts has been 
among the states in which relative employment  has steadily declined. 
Employment  growth in Massachusetts  was below the U.S. rate for all 
but  four  years  from 1948  to 1979.  In the early 1980s,  however, a number 
of industries  experienced  a boom in demand,  and  from 1980  to 1985  an- 
nual employment  growth  was 2.0 percent-0.6  percent higher  than the 
national  average. To many, it appeared  that the underlying  trend was 
changing-an occurrence  which, as we have documented,  does not ap- 
pear  to have happened  to more  than  a couple of states over the postwar 
period.  The unemployment  rate, which was equal  to the national  rate  in 
1979,  stood at 3.6 percent  below the national  average  in 1985.  Relative 
wages in manufacturing,  which  were 11  percent  below the national  aver- 
age in 1979, were only 5 percent below the national  average by 1985. 
CPS wages showed a similar  evolution, increasing  from  about  3 percent 
below the national  average  in 1979  to 1 percent  above in 1985.  Housing 
prices in Boston increased  from 17 percent above the national  average 
in 1979  to 57 percent  above the national  average  in 1985. 
By 1985,  however, relative employment  growth had already  turned 
sharply  lower. In every year  from 1985  to 1991,  employment  growth  was 
lower  than  the national  average,  averaging  - 0.1 percent  a year, or about 
2.2 percent  below the national  average.  The decline in employment  was 
particularly  sharp  in 1990  and 1991:  - 4 percent  and - 6 percent,  respec- 
tively. Relative unemployment  increased steadily; by 1991,  the unem- 
ployment  rate stood at 2 percent above the national  average. Not until 
1990  were relative  wages in manufacturing  stabilized.  By then, they had 
increased  another  10  percent  from  their 1985  value to stand  at 5 percent 
above average. CPS relative  wages followed a similar  pattern;  by 1990, 
they were 10 percent above the national average. The turnaround  in Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  53 
housing  prices  was faster,  with  relative  housing  prices  in Boston peaking 
at 72 percent above the national  average in 1987  and decreasing  to 60 
percent  above average  in 1990. 
The debate  in Massachusetts  has centered  on the question  of whether 
the bust of the late 1980s  was caused by the boom of the early 1980s  and 
thus was, in effect, "home  grown."57  If the experience  of Massachusetts 
were typical of what we found, the answer would clearly be negative. 
Our  tracing  of typical responses did not show signs of oscillations-of 
movements  in wages leading  to overshooting  of employment  responses, 
or of busts  following  booms. We would  conclude  that  first,  a sharp  exog- 
enous increase in demand  occurred  in the early 1980s,  in particular  for 
minicomputers  and various forms of financial  services, followed by a 
sharp  exogenous  decrease  in demand,  for roughly  the same  products,  in 
the late 1980s. We would forecast that Massachusetts  would return  to 
normal  over the next half  decade  through  a steady  increase  in net outmi- 
gration  of workers. 
However, there are signs that the Massachusetts  experience of the 
1980s  has been atypical. The numbers  above about wage and housing 
price growth appear large; we indicated  earlier that the responses of 
New England  states of wages to employment  appeared  to be stronger 
than  the standard  response. Thus  we perform  a simple  exercise: we sim- 
ulate  the response  of wages and  housing  prices  to the actual  employment 
path, using the equations estimated above from pooled data; we then 
compute  the prediction  errors.  We find  that  manufacturing  wage  growth 
from 1979  to 1986  was consistent with  the evolution  of employment,  but 
substantially  exceeded its predicted  value  after 1986.  From 1986  to 1990, 
actual nominal  wage growth was 20 percent, twice its predicted  value 
of 10 percent. Our simulation  exercise also shows that housing prices 
increased much more than in a typical regional boom. From 1979 to 
1986,  the actual  increase  in housing  prices was 87 percent, compared  to 
a predicted  47 percent.  From 1986  to 1990,  both  the actual  and  predicted 
increases were 9 percent. Thus the evidence points to a stronger  re- 
sponse of wages and housing  prices than is typically the case and sug- 
gests that the bust may have been partially  caused by the earlier  boom. 
Thus, somewhat unfortunately,  the experience that partly motivated 
our study turns out to be atypical. Further  progress on separating  the 
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role of the previous boom and of adverse shocks requires  a more de- 
tailed look at disaggregated  employment;  we do not pursue that here. 
Instead,  we turn  to three  larger  issues raised  by our  findings. 
Is the Adjustment Process  Efficient? 
We have shown that most of the adjustment  of states to shocks is 
through  movements  of labor,  rather  than  through  job creation  orjob mi- 
gration.  U.S. states affected by an adverse shock may find  this adjust- 
ment unappealing.  However, if firms' and workers' private costs and 
benefits  of moving  reflect  social costs and  benefits,  the adjustment  is ef- 
ficient. Do private  costs and benefits reflect social costs and benefits? 
Many reasons exist to suspect that they do not. Wages may not be re- 
sponsive enough to labor market  conditions, leading to excess unem- 
ployment  and  (as our  model shows) too large  a long-run  response  of em- 
ployment to  shocks. Liquidity constraints may force workers who 
become unemployed  to leave the state rather  than borrow  and wait for 
the upturn,  leading  to excessive labor  out-migration  (although  we have 
seen that the behavior  of housing  prices, which may come from a thin 
housing  market,  may induce owners to stay). Increasing  fiscal burdens 
and  fiscal  crises in states  that  experience  adverse  shocks may  deter  firms 
from  coming, despite lower wages. Our  paper,  which is largely  descrip- 
tive, cannot answer those questions. However, further, more micro- 
based  work  can provide  answers  and  thus  give a richer  picture  of the ad- 
justment process. Two directions of empirical research strike us as 
promising.  The first  is the integration  of our  results  with micro-evidence 
about  who moves and  who is left behind.58  The second is a characteriza- 
tion of the separate responses of job creation and job destruction  to 
shocks. The data  base on the distribution  of employment  changes  by es- 
tablishment  compiled  by Steven Davis and  John  Haltiwanger  seems well 
adapted  to the task.59 
Implications for  Growth 
We argued  earlier  that any model of regional  fluctuations  must be at 
least consistent  with  the existence of large  differences  in rates  of growth 
across states. The model we developed could explain (admittedly  in 
58.  See Topel (1986) and Bartik (1991) for a start. 
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black-box fashion)  both trends  and  fluctuations.  Our  empirical  work  fo- 
cused on fluctuations,  and  our somewhat  casual  examination  of the rela- 
tion between average growth rates, unemployment  rates, and relative 
wages did not yield any sharp  conclusions. Does what we have learned 
from  fluctuations  provide  hints  about  trends? 
Research  on regional  growth  has focused on this question  at two lev- 
els. The first is whether differences in state growth have been caused 
primarily  by movements  of workers,  which trigger  an inflow  of firms,  or 
from  movements  of firms,  which  trigger  an inflow  of workers.  In the ter- 
minology  of our model, the first  question  has been whether  growth  was 
primarily  caused by differences  in  x,i or Xdi. The second question  is what 
makes firms  or workers  prefer  one state to another-what  lies behind 
the x's. Focusing on firms,  two main  hypotheses have been developed. 
The "footloose"  hypothesis  holds that  the postwar  period  has been a pe- 
riod of adjustment;  costs of being some distance  from major  markets  or 
major  industrial  centers  have steadily  decreased,  inducing  firms  to move 
from  the old manufacturing  regions  to the South  and  the West. The sec- 
ond  hypothesis  is that  some states  have offered  industrial  structures  that 
have been consistently more conducive to growth. Those states have 
had young growing  industries;  have been able to attract  new young in- 
dustries; or simply have been able to attract a steady flow of new 
firms.60  As a result, these states have been able to grow  faster  than oth- 
ers. Our  results  can shed no light  on the second set of issues; that  would 
require  more disaggregated  data.61  But our results can shed some light 
on the first. If steady movement  of workers  to more pleasant  regions of 
the South and West was the causal mechanism,  the change  would have 
had to have worked through  lower wages resulting  from migration  of 
workers, which in turn triggered  a movement of firms. However, our 
analysis  shows that  the response  ofjob creation  to movements  in wages 
appears  weak. This suggests  that  the primary  cause of differences  in em- 
ployment  growth  across states is movements  of firms, which triggered 
movements  of workers. 
Implications for  Europe 
What  are the implications  of our findings  for those countries  that are 
moving toward a fixed exchange rate zone with few or no barriers  to 
60.  See Miracky (1992). 
61.  See Glaeser and others (1991) and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1991). 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
goods and factor mobility?  A common argument  raised during  discus- 
sions of a common  currency  area  for Europe  is that, once the common 
currency  is introduced  and exchange rates are thus irrevocably  fixed, 
firms  and workers  will no longer expect to be bailed out by monetary 
expansion and depreciation.  Faced with a decline in competitiveness, 
firms will find that wage concessions and productivity  improvements 
will  be quicker,  leading  to a faster  return  to full  employment.  The experi- 
ence of the United States clearly shows the limits of this argument.  In 
response  to an adverse shock in demand,  relative  nominal  wages indeed 
decline, but they do not decline  by a large  enough  amount  to prevent  in- 
creases in unemployment.  What  they trigger  is mostly labor  out-migra- 
tion, rather  than  job in-migration  orjob creation. 
Furthermore,  European  countries  are likely to remain  quite  different 
from U.S. states in a number  of ways. First, in the United States, sub- 
stantial  interstate  transfers  operating  through  the federal  tax and trans- 
fer system help cushion the impact  of regional  shocks.62  Such a system 
of transfers  is unlikely  to be implemented  on the same scale in Europe. 
Labor  mobility  across European  countries  is also likely to remain  lower 
than  labor  mobility  across U.S. states.63  To the extent that  labor  mobil- 
ity is the main source of adjustment  in the United States, this suggests 
that shocks will have larger  and longer  lasting  effects on relative  unem- 
ployment  in Europe.64  This conclusion  must  be qualified  to allow  for the 
possibility  that  lower labor  mobility  in Europe  than  in the United States 
may lead to more  wage flexibility  on the part  of workers  in Europe  than 
in the United States. Absent this high wage flexibility, our paper thus 
warns, the adjustment  to relative  shocks in the European  common  cur- 
rency area  may turn  out to be a painful  and  protracted  process. 
62.  See Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991). 
63.  Eichengreen (1992) finds that net migration is much less sensitive  to shocks to re- 
gional  wages  and unemployment  in Italy and Great Britain than in the  United  States. 
Houseman  and Abraham (1990) find that regional employment  shocks  generate substan- 
tially more net migration in the United States than in Germany. 
64.  The importance of labor mobility for the desirability of common  currency areas 
dates at least back to the work of Mundell (1961). Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  57 
APPENDIX 
Description of Data 
IN THIS APPENDIX,  we describe  the state and  U.S. aggregate  time series 
used in our  paper. 
Employment 
The basic measure of employment  is the establishment-based  total 
nonagricultural  employment  series, taken  from  the Bureau  of Labor  Sta- 
tistics (BLS) Employment  and Earnings. The data range  from 1947  to 
1990  for the United States as a whole and for all states (except Alaska 
and  Hawaii;  their  data  begin  in 1960  and 1955,  respectively). 
Unemployment  and Labor Force Participation  Rates 
The basic measures of unemployment  and participation  come from 
the Current  Population  Survey  (CPS).  These series, taken  from  the BLS 
Geographic Profile of Employment  and  Unemployment,  are available 
for all states from 1976  to 1990  and  for 10  large  states from 1970.  Data on 
unemployment  for the other 40 states and the District of Columbia  for 
years  prior  to 1976  were constructed  from  BLS unemployment  rates  for 
Labor Market  Areas (LMAs) and were provided  by Hugh Courtney. 
The  construction  of unemployment  rates  for LMAs is described  in chap- 
ter  4 of the BLS Handbook  of Methods, 1988.  These rates  were normal- 
ized to equal  the CPS figure  for 1976  in each state. 
The estimation  of the dynamic  responses of employment,  unemploy- 
ment,  and  participation  uses establishment  employment,  which  is likely 
to be more  accurate  for small  states than  its CPS counterpart.  The labor 
force is defined  as the sum of establishment  employment  and of unem- 
ployment  from  the CPS. We normalize  the establishment-based  series, 
which includes  only nonagricultural  employment,  by multiplying  it by a 
state-specific  constant so that it is equal to the CPS number  in a base 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Actiity,  1:1992 
year, 1976.  Population  is the sum of normalized  establishment  employ- 
ment  and  of the CPS series  for unemployment  and  out of the labor  force. 
Alternative specifications, such as household data for all three vari- 
ables, yield generally  similar  results. 
Wages 
The standard  wage series used in the paper  is the BLS establishment- 
based average  hourly  earnings  of manufacturing  production  workers.  It 
is available  for all states in  Employment and Earnings. The series gener- 
ally covers the period  from the late 1940s  or early 1950s  to the present, 
although the exact starting date varies across states. They are as 
follows: 
Maine  1948  North Carolina  1950 
New Hampshire  1947  South Carolina  1949 
Vermont  1949  Georgia  1949 
Massachusetts  1950  Florida  1948 
Rhode Island  1947  Kentucky  1954 
Connecticut  1948  Tennessee  1948 
New York  1947  Alabama  1949 
New Jersey  1947  Mississippi  1950 
Pennsylvania  1947  Arkansas  1949 
Ohio  1952  Louisiana  1950 
Indiana  1948  Oklahoma  1948 
Illinois  1947  Texas  1949 
Michigan  1947  Montana  1950 
Wisconsin  1947  Idaho  1950 
Minnesota  1947  Wyoming  1950 
Iowa  1949  Colorado  1951 
Missouri  1951  New Mexico  1949 
North Dakota  1956  Arizona  1949 
South Dakota  1950  Utah  1947 
Nebraska  1950  Nevada  1950 
Kansas  1949  Washington  1947 
Delaware  1947  Oregon  1950 
Maryland  1950  California  1947 
District of Columbia  1972  Alaska  1961 
Virginia  1950  Hawaii  1961 
West Virginia  1951 
Average  hourly  earnings  for the United  States are  available  beginning  in 
1947. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and  Lawrence  F. Katz  59 
The wage measure that controls for industry and worker characteris- 
tics was  constructed  annually from  1979 to  1989 from the CPS.  Each 
month, the CPS collects  wage information from one-quarter of its sam- 
ple. Using these wages,  we estimated earnings equations each year for 
men and women  separately.  Log usually hourly wages were regressed 
on linear, quadratic, cubic,  and quartic experience  terms and dummy 
variables capturing an individual's education level,  racial background, 
urban-rural  residence,  and full-time or part-time work status, as well as 
the occupation  and industry in which  the individual is employed.  We 
then  constructed  the  worker-characteristic-controlled  wage  for  each 
year in each state as the average residual across all males and females in 
the state for that year. Results  of the earnings function estimation  are 
available upon request. 
Per Capita Income 
State per capita income  is constructed  using personal income  from 
the Bureau of Economic  Analysis Survey of Current Business for 1948- 
90 (except  for  the  District  of  Columbia,  Alaska,  and Hawaii  series, 
which begin in 1958); and total resident population from the Census Bu- 
reau' s P-25 publication for 1948-90. 
City House Prices 
City house  prices are median house  prices of existing  single family 
homes for 39 cities and the United States published in the National Asso- 
ciation  of  Realtors  Home  Sales  Yearbook and  taken  from  Poterba 
(1991). The data cover the period up to 1990; start dates vary across cit- 
ies. The cities and start dates are as follows: 
Boston,  MA  1969  Akron,  OH  1980 
Providence,  RI  1979  Columbus,  OH  1979 
Hartford, CT  1980  Indianapolis,  IN  1979 
Albany,  NY  1979  Chicago,  IL  1969 
New  York, NY  1969  Detroit,  MI  1969 
Rochester,  NY  1979  Grand Rapids,  MI  1980 
Syracuse,  NY  1980  Milwaukee,  WI  1973 
Philadelphia, PA  1969  Minneapolis,  MN  1969 60  Brookings Papers on Economic Actiity,  1:1  992 
Des  Moines,  IA  1980  Tulsa,  OK  1980 
Kansas  City,  MO  1979  El Paso,  TX  1980 
St.  Louis,  MO  1973  Houston,  TX  1969 
Baltimore,  MD  1969  San Antonio,  TX  1979 
Washington,  DC  1973  Albuquerque,  NM  1980 
Atlanta,  GA  1969  Salt Lake City,  UT  1979 
Ft.  Lauderdale,  FL  1979  Los  Angeles,  CA  1969 
Tampa, FL  1979  Riverside,  CA  1979 
Louisville,  KY  1980  Sacramento,  CA  1980 
Memphis,  TN  1979  San Diego,  CA  1979 
Nashville,  TN  1980  San Francisco,  CA  1969 
Birmingham, AL  1979 
City Consumer Prices 
Consumer  prices used in the paper  are  consumer  price  indexes for all 
urban  consumers  and all items. These data range  from 1965  to 1988  for 
the following  23 cities: 
Atlanta, GA  Dallas, TX  Miami, FL  San Diego, CA 
Baltimore, MD  Denver, CO  Milwaukee, WI  San Francisco, CA 
Boston, MA  Detroit, MI  Minneapolis, MN  Seattle, WA 
Chicago, IL  Houston, TX  New York, NY  St. Louis, MO 
Cincinnati, OH  Kansas City, MO  Philadelphia, PA  Washington, DC 
Cleveland, OH  Los Angeles, CA  Pittsburgh, PA 
Net Migration 
Net migration  figures  are from Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1991).  They 
are averages  of annual  net migration,  divided  by initial  state population 
for the periods 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80,  and 1980-87. 
Defense Spending 
The measure  of defense spending  used in the paper  is the real value 
of military  prime  contract  awards  by state from Davis, Loungani,  and 
Mahidhara  (1991).  The series is deflated  using  the 1982  GNP deflator  and 
ranges from 1951 to  1988 in calendar years (except for Alaska and 
Hawaii,  whose observations  begin  in 1960). Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  61 
Mix Variable 
The mix variable  was constructed  and  given to us by Timothy  Bartik 
along  the lines of Bartik  (1991).  The variable  measures  the predicted  em- 
ployment  growth  rate for each state in each year under  the assumption 
that each of the state's two-digit  industries  had the same employment 
growth rate as the national average employment  growth rate for that 
sector. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: Olivier  Blanchard  and Lawrence  Katz provide  an ex- 
traordinarily  careful  and  insightful  investigation  of labor-market  dynam- 
ics at the level of the states of the United States. The paper  reaches sur- 
prisingly  strong  conclusions about the predominance  of migration  over 
other forms of adjustment  to changing  economic fundamentals  at the 
state level in the longer  run. After seven years, they find, an increase  in 
demand  results entirely  in an increase  in employment,  with no increase 
in labor  force participation  or decrease in unemployment.  In the longer 
run, quantities,  not prices, make  the adjustment. 
My first  comment  is that  the longer  run  is pretty  long. The responses 
at the state level are at considerably  lower  frequencies  than  the national 
business cycle. A state or regional  cycle at roughly  the five-year  fre- 
quency is superimposed  on the generally  faster  national  cycle. Thus the 
best forecast  of national  unemployment  three  years  from  now is full em- 
ployment, but unemployment  in any particular  state would be forecast 
to be lower than  now if conditions  are worse in the state than  the nation 
this year. 
The economic  model  supported  by the results  is easy to describe.  The 
supply of labor to any state is perfectly elastic in the longer run. Any 
shift in labor  demand  at the state level causes a movement  along  a hori- 
zontal  labor  supply  schedule. In the theoretical  model, equation  6 com- 
pels perfectly  elastic long-run  labor supply  because labor supply  keeps 
growing  as long  as there  is any  wage differential.  However, the empirical 
work  does not build  in this assumption;  it is a derived  conclusion. 
The core evidence on labor supply  is summarized  right  at the begin- 
ning  of the paper:  large  and  persistent  differences  in employment  growth 
occur across states. Figure  2 shows these differences  dramatically.  By 
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contrast,  relative  unemployment  rates show only transitory  departures 
from an underlying  structure  of relative rates dictated  by employment 
mix. The annual  mean reversion coefficients generally  lie in the range 
from 20 percent to 40 percent. Individually,  these are not significantly 
different  from  zero. 
To complete  the story, the authors  should  also investigate  the persis- 
tence of changes  in labor  force participation.  The only evidence on this 
point  is later, in the fourth  section ("Employment,  Unemployment,  and 
Participation"),  where  we find  the simple  statement  that  labor  force par- 
ticipation  in a state  (relative  to the national  average),  along  with  employ- 
ment  growth  and  unemployment,  "appear  to be stationary."  It would  be 
useful to see a bit more  of the evidence. 
The conclusion  favoring  perfectly  elastic long-run  labor  supply  is in- 
evitable, given the behavior  of the three variables. If employment  in a 
state can change a great deal and tends to remain  at the new level, but 
unemployment  and labor  force participation  return  to normal,  then no 
other  possible conclusion  exists but that the population  has changed  to 
accommodate  the higher  employment. 
The detailed  study  of this  issue in the fourth  section, based  on a three- 
variable  VAR, is useful confirmation  of the proposition  that unemploy- 
ment and labor force participation  do not absorb state-level shocks in 
the longer  run. In a sense, the VAR is unnecessary. It could show that 
even though there were persistent movements in unemployment  and 
participation,  those movements were exogenous and not associated 
with the persistent  movements  in employment.  But in fact there are no 
persistent  movements  in unemployment  and  participation,  so we never 
reach the question  that the VAR could answer. The univariate  proper- 
ties of the three  variables  dictate  the findings  of the VAR. 
An important  econometric  shortcoming  infects the methods  used to 
reach the basic conclusion of the paper. The samples are extremely 
short  by the standards  of time-series  econometrics. The VAR has only 
13 observations  and the univariate  analysis of unemployment  has only 
19  observations.  A dictum  of time-series  statistics  holds that  the persis- 
tence of a time-series  is understated  by estimation  in short  samples.  The 
replication  across states does nothing  to relieve the downward  bias, al- 
though  it reduces  the sampling  error  of the estimates. Samples  as short 
as those used by Blanchard  and Katz are strictly  terra  incognita  within 
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Because a downward  bias occurs in the estimates of the persistence 
of employment  as well, I suspect that the stark  difference  between the 
high persistence of employment  and the low persistence of unemploy- 
ment and participation  at the state level will withstand  corrections  for 
small-sample  bias. The question is then what to make of the finding, 
within the supply-demand  framework.  The authors  argue  aggressively 
that the finding  that unemployment  and participation  do not track em- 
ployment in the longer run supports  the perfectly-elastic-labor-supply 
view because the employment changes are the result exclusively of 
shifts of the demand  schedule,  without  shifts  of the supply  schedule. 
The authors  always state  this identification  hypothesis  in terms  of the 
innovations  in employment,  which they interpret  as shocks to demand, 
rather  than supply. In their model, employment  is the moving average 
of its own current  and past innovations  and of past innovations  in the 
labor  force and  participation  rate.  The paper  does not reveal  the relative 
importance  of the demand  shock, on the one hand, and  the lagged  labor 
force and participation  shocks, on the other hand. To the extent that 
most of the action comes from the demand  shock, the authors  actually 
are saying  that the persistent,  as well as the unexpected, movements  in 
employment  are caused  by shifts  in demand  and  not in supply.  I found  it 
useful to ponder  the panels of figure  2 in thinking  about  this issue. The 
panel  for the oil states is pretty  convincing.  Be sure  to keep your  eye on 
the different  vertical scales of the graphs  in figure  2. By far the biggest 
fact in the figure  is the extreme  growth  of the Sun Belt states. The identi- 
fying hypothesis says that demand shifts in the national  economy for 
products  in which California  and Florida  have comparative  advantages 
caused  the extreme  excess growth  of the Sun  Belt. It is essential  to stress 
that the conditions that might affect labor supply-the  favorable cli- 
mates of the Sun Belt states-are  permanent  and could not have a role 
in changes in employment, except for chronic differences in growth 
rates. One would have to assert a shift of preferences toward sunny 
states to get a supply  shift. 
I would accept Blanchard  and Katz's conclusion  that labor  supply  is 
highly  elastic to a particular  state in the longer  run. I would add  that la- 
bor demand  is also highly  elastic, as in the theoretical  model in this pa- 
per. The state distribution  of employment  is then a matter  of a fragile 
equilibrium:  very small  changes  in either supply  or demand  cause large 
changes  in employment  in the longer  run.  The spatial  distribution  of em- Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  65 
ployment  is close to indeterminate.  Because of increasing  returns  in the 
types of activities that occur in cities, large  cities develop in natural  ag- 
glomeration  points. A significant  part  of the overall  findings  of this paper 
has to do with the explosive growth  of huge modern  metropolitan  areas 
in Arizona,  California,  and  Florida. 
Running  through  the paper  is a suggestion  that  the persistent  effect of 
a demand shock tells us something about the strength of economic 
forces that counteract  the shock. For example, the authors  argue that 
most of the adjustment  to an adverse shock of employment  is through 
out-migration  of labor, rather  than  through  the in-migration  or creation 
of jobs. At this point, the only evidence they have marshaled  in favor 
of the proposition  is the extreme  persistence  of the effects of what they 
consider demand  shocks. They seem to assume that demand  shifts are 
inherently  one-time  random-walk  shifts, so that the effects a year later 
and  after  are the result  of endogenous  responses. But no basis exists for 
this implicit  assumption.  The demand  shift  itself could have any form  of 
persistence. All that is observed in the data used in this paper  and dis- 
played in the impulse  response diagrams  is the net effect of a possibly 
persistent  demand  change and the offsetting adjustment  through  wage 
changes. 
Later in the paper, the authors support  their view by showing that 
there is little feedback  in their  model through  wages. If we accept all of 
their  identifying  assumptions,  we must conclude that there is relatively 
little shock absorption  by wages. Even in the short  run, labor  supply  is 
effectively highly  wage elastic, possibly because of wage rigidity. 
The authors  deserve congratulations  for pulling  together  an impres- 
sive body of evidence on the  joint behavior  of employment,  unemploy- 
ment, wages, and  housing  prices. By and  large,  the data  support  current 
ideas about the determinants  of economic activity. States do not have 
natural  levels of employment,  dictated  by a neoclassical long-run  equi- 
librium  with  diminishing  returns  to crowding  extra  labor  in a given state. 
Instead,  agglomeration  efficiencies  are great  enough  to make  the distri- 
bution  of employment  across states indeterminate.  Temporary  shocks 
leave permanent  legacies. 
Barry  Eichengreen: Olivier  Blanchard  and  Larry  Katz have done a sig- 
nal service by helping  to awaken  the profession  to the importance  of re- 
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said that all macroeconomics  is regional.  It is important  to think  harder 
than we traditionally  have about the market  area or region to which a 
particular  macroeconomic  analysis  applies. 
The appeal  of the paper  lies in the simple and intuitive  story it tells. 
(I will introduce  its elements in a different  sequence than the authors.) 
Adjustments  to regional  labor  demand  shocks occur mainly  through  in- 
terregional  migration.  If labor  demand  falls in a depressed  region  such as 
Massachusetts,  unemployment  rises there. Workers  emigrate  to lower 
unemployment  regions. During  this transition,  aggregate  employment 
grows  more  slowly in depressed  regions  than  in other  regions.  After  sev- 
eral years-six  to ten years, in the case of Massachusetts-the  unem- 
ployment  rate has returned  to the national  average. However, the level 
of employment  is permanently  lower  in the depressed  region  and  perma- 
nently  higher  elsewhere. (For the rest of this commentary,  I will refer  to 
Massachusetts  as a shorthand  for depressed  regions.) 
This story as I have told it has two obvious limitations,  one of which 
the authors  deal  with more  satisfactorily  than  the other.  The first  is wage 
adjustment.  Implicit  in the summary  of the previous  paragraph  is the as- 
sumption  that wages in Massachusetts  do not decline sufficiently  to ra- 
tion all of the unemployed  back into work. Blanchard  and Katz show 
that some decline of relative  wages occurs in Massachusetts,  but that it 
is slow and does little to shift the adjustment  burden  away from migra- 
tion. Just why wage relativities  across regions  should  be so inflexible  as 
to permit  regional  unemployment  rates to diverge  for six to ten years is 
unclear.  I will return  to this question  in another  context. 
The second limitation  of this story is that  it is not clear, as I have de- 
scribed  it, why employment  growth  rates (as opposed to levels) should 
continue  to differ  across states or regions  for at least four decades, and 
perhaps  longer,  as figure  1 in the paper  suggests  they do. After  six years 
or so, migration  should be complete and unemployment  in Massachu- 
setts should  have returned  to the national  average. The labor  force will 
have contracted  permanently  in Massachusetts  (relative  to its underly- 
ing trend)  and expanded  permanently  elsewhere. Thereafter,  all states 
should  grow at the same rate as before and, in the absence of additional 
complications,  at the same rate as one another.  Yet figure  1 shows that 
employment  persistently  grows at different  rates in different  states. 
Blanchard  and Katz explain this finding  by adding, somewhat arbi- 
trarily,  region-specific  effects to their  migration  and  labor  demand  equa- Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  67 
tions. Thus they replicate  the persistent employment  growth differen- 
tials across regions  found in the data by assuming  particular  processes 
for the forcing variables, not through  the intrinsic dynamics of their 
model. In a reference  ideally  designed  to disarm  their  discussants, they 
justify the extra term in the migration  equation  by appealing  to the at- 
tractiveness  of the California  lifestyle. They  justify the additional  term 
in the labor  demand  equation  by asserting  that the supply and demand 
curves for the different  goods in which different  regions specialize  per- 
sistently shift  outward  at different  rates. 
Let me suggest two additional sources of long-term employment 
growth  differentials  across regions.  One  is the settlement  patterns  of im- 
migrants.  Immigrants  from Asia or Mexico are more likely to arrive  in 
California  than, say, Iowa, and  once there,  to settle, because  prior  immi- 
grants  who have not yet moved away from the port of entry provide a 
natural  network  through  which social and  economic information  can be 
transmitted.  One might  argue  that, in response  to immigration  from  Asia 
to California,  wages in California  should decline and unemployment 
there  should  rise, discouraging  in-migration  from  other  states and main- 
taining the equality of long-term employment growth rates between 
them. Alternatively, native and immigrant  workers may be comple- 
ments rather  than substitutes, in which case these implications  do not 
follow.  1 Either  way, the neglect  of immigration  from  abroad  is one of the 
more  serious  limitations  of Blanchard  and  Katz's paper  and  a prominent 
omission  from  their  research  agenda. 
A second category of explanation  would build on the literature  on 
hysteresis in unemployment.  There has been a fair amount  of work at- 
tempting  to test-not  very successfully, one must admit-reasons why 
a one-time  shock to labor  demand  might  have permanent  effects on the 
level of unemployment.  Some of these arguments  might  be adapted  to 
explain persistent  differences  across regions in the growth of employ- 
ment. One is struck  by the absence of such issues from a paper  that  has 
as one of its coauthors  the godfather  of much  of the hysteresis  literature. 
An advantage  of pursuing  this tack is that  it would  provide  an opening  to 
the literature  in regional  economics, much of which emphasizes more 
than  the authors  do the absence of self-correcting  responses to regional 
employment  decline.2 
1.  So Keynes argues for the United States.  See Thomas (1958, p. 382). 
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The extent of the regional  divergences  documented  by the authors  is 
remarkable  in light of the integration  of the national  economy. Even 
apart  from  the slump  in New England,  which alerted  our academic  col- 
leagues from the other Massachusetts  Avenue (through  its impact on 
housing  prices  and  university  budgets)  to the importance  of changing  re- 
gional fortunes, there are good reasons to think about the issues this 
raises. For example, U.S.  evidence-and  Blanchard  and Katz's pa- 
per-provides a guide  to life after  economic  integration  in the European 
Community  (EC). It implies  that  regional  problems  will remain  and  may 
even grow in severity once the process of economic and financial  inte- 
gration  there  is complete. 
Indeed, regional  differentials  and the political problems  they entail 
are likely to be even more serious in an integrated  Europe than in the 
United States. One reason  is lower levels of labor  mobility.  With  the re- 
moval  of statutory  barriers  to migration,  movement  across national  bor- 
ders within  the EC will rise. However, it is worth  noting  that labor  mo- 
bility even within  European  countries  is lower than mobility  within  the 
United States, and there are no statutory  barriers  to the former. In a 
forthcoming  paper, I estimate internal  migration  models using regional 
data for the United States, Britain, and Italy.3  Because my migration 
specification  is essentially  the one Blanchard  and  Katz use in the version 
of their model that includes unemployment,  the U.S. results may be of 
some interest: 
Migration =  1.50  +  14.13  A ln (Wages)1  -  0.37  Iln  (Unem.)_ 
(5.76)  (2.52)  (1.92) 
-  0.05  Migration-,. 
(0.05) 
The dependent  variable  is immigration  scaled by population,  while 
the independent  variables  are  the lagged  changes  in log wages (local  rela- 
tive to national)  and the unemployment  rate (local to national), and 
lagged immigration.  The figures in parentheses are t statistics. This 
equation  is estimated  with pooled data  for nine U.S. divisions  from 1962 
to 1988 and includes fixed effects for divisions. Thus U.S.  migration 
does appear  to respond  in the way Blanchard  and Katz assume. 
Analogous  estimates  for Europe  reveal  that  the elasticity  of migration 
3.  Eichengreen (1992). Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz  69 
with respect to unemployment  differentials  is twice as large in the 
United States as in either European country. In the case of relative 
wages, the ratio of the U.S. elasticity to the corresponding  British  and 
Italian  elasticities is even larger.  This suggests to me that low levels of 
labor mobility in Europe reflect not merely legal restrictions,  but also 
culture, language,  and history. We should not expect European  labor 
mobility  to rise to U.S. levels as a result  of the elimination  of barriers  in 
the EC. 
A second reason  for worrying  about  divergent  regional  evolutions in 
an integrated  Europe is that regional  specialization  in production,  and 
hence the regional  ramifications  of shocks to particular  product mar- 
kets, will surely rise over time. Tamim  Bayoumi  and I,' as well as Paul 
Krugman,5  point out that the traditional  balkanization  of the European 
economy has sustained  higher  levels of sectoral  diversification  in Euro- 
pean nations than in U.S. regions. This has important  implications  for 
the cyclical behavior  of unemployment  rates in different  regions. In a 
1990  paper,  I regressed  unemployment  in each of nine U.S. divisions  on 
national  unemployment  and unemployment  in each of nine European 
countries on EC unemployment, estimating Ps much like those in 
Blanchard  and Katz's table 2.6 One finds much higher  R2s  for Europe, 
despite  greater  scope there  for differences  in economic  policy across na- 
tions; this supports  the notion  that European  nations  act as though  they 
are less specialized  in production.  I also have related  unemployment  in 
each of ten British  regions  to British  unemployment,  and  unemployment 
in each of nine Italian  regions  to Italian  unemployment.7  At this level no 
difference  from the United States is apparent;  Britain  and Italy act as 
though  they are as specialized  internally  as the United States. 
A third  reason  for anticipating  serious  regional  problems  in Europe  is 
that  the EC lacks  a Community-wide  system of fiscal  federalism  like that 
of the United  States. Xavier  Sala-i-Martin  and  Jeffrey  Sachs  have shown 
for the United States that  declining  federal  tax payments  and  increasing 
federal  transfers  provide  roughly  a one-third  offset to a regional-specific 
decline  in activity.8  Insofar  as incomes  and  spending  are maintained,  the 
4.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (forthcoming). 
5.  Krugman (forthcoming). 
6.  See table DI in Eichengreen (1990). 
7.  Eichengreen (1992). 
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rise in the region's  unemployment  is moderated.  So long as the EC bud- 
get remains 1.2 percent of Community  GDP (or even if it reaches EC 
President Jacques Delors' medium-term  target of 2 percent), scope 
hardly  exists for the Community  budget  to provide  regional  coinsurance 
of this sort. One might  conjecture  that  fiscal  federalism  within  EC mem- 
ber states, like the fiscal transfer  from southern  to northern  California 
that  followed  the Loma  Prieta  earthquake,  can go some way toward  sub- 
stituting  for fiscal  transfers  between them, but this has not been system- 
atically  analyzed  so far as I know. 
Finally,  one can imagine  the development  of EC-wide  wage norms  or 
Community-wide  collective bargaining  arrangements  that will provide 
even less room  for wage adjustments  across regions than in the United 
States. Some might  regard  this as far-fetched.  But recall German  eco- 
nomic and monetary  unification,  in response to which German  unions, 
without government  resistance, quickly moved to prevent the emer- 
gence of persistent regional wage gaps between eastern and western 
Germany.  The explanation  for this lack of resistance is precisely that 
large-scale  east-west migration  was regarded  as socially disruptive  and 
undesirable.  Wage equalization  (in conjunction  with maintenance  pay- 
ments for the unemployed)  was designed to prevent large-scale  migra- 
tion from occurring.  Large-scale  migration  from southern  to northern 
Europe  would likely be regarded  by elected officials and some of their 
constituents  as even more disruptive  and undesirable.  Hence measures 
to systematically  equalize  pay and  working  conditions  across European 
regions might  be encouraged  to limit the incentive to migrate.  We see 
hints  of this in the Social Charter  embraced  at Maastricht  by every Com- 
munity  member  except the United Kingdom.  (From  this argument  one 
would  predict,  in the absence  of other  information,  that  the United  King- 
dom  was insulated  from  the threat  of intra-EC  migration  by a substantial 
body of water.) 
For  all these reasons, then, Blanchard  and  Katz's paper  is not only an 
insightful  analysis of the United States, but also a warning  for Europe. 
General  Discussion 
Several panelists discussed factors that were not included  explicitly 
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of states. The rapid  growth  of the Sun Belt states is one notable  feature 
of the data, and  Alan Blinder  reasoned  that  the shift  terms  in the growth 
equations were capturing  factors such as air conditioning  and ease of 
travel that were crucial  to that rapid  growth. However, Blinder  argued 
that  such innovations  show considerable  persistence  over time  and  have 
gradually  affected  the desirability  of living in the South, rather  than  op- 
erating  like the discrete changes modeled  by shift terms. Janet  Rothen- 
berg Pack recalled  that some previous studies of U.S. regional  growth 
found  that  factors other  than  the in-migration  of labor, such as the mas- 
sive release of labor  from  agriculture  and the subsequent  movements  of 
firms  taking  advantage  of lower wage labor,  were important  initiators  of 
the Sun Belt's growth. Robert Gordon  reasoned that the evolution of 
technology has resulted in more knowledge-based  employment. This 
has changed  what  is important  in an  area, stimulating  the growth  of areas 
with amenities,  such as the Sun Belt, at the expense of those with prox- 
imity  to raw  materials.  Olivier  Blanchard  emphasized  that  the model  did 
not attempt  to model long-run  growth, but addressed  only the issue of 
how regions  respond  to shocks. The long-run  growth  process was left as 
a "black  box" in the model. 
Robert Shiller suggested that, a priori, he would expect firms  to be 
more, rather  than  less, mobile  than  workers. He argued  that  the inelas- 
ticity of the residential  housing  stock would tie down the population  for 
substantial  periods, and thus found it unlikely that labor mobility  was 
the most important  factor  in the adjustment  to regional  demand  shocks. 
With  a relatively  inelastic  housing  stock, the price  of housing  would  bear 
the brunt  of adverse regional  shocks, with declines in house prices dis- 
couraging  out-migration.  Although  the physical  capital  stock of firms  is 
also inelastic  in the short  run, it is significantly  smaller  and depreciates 
much more rapidly  than the residential  housing stock. Thus adjusting 
the location of plants would be relatively less expensive than moving 
people and  their  housing. 
Shiller  also reasoned  that  it was important  to distinguish  between ab- 
solute and relative  reductions  in the demand  for labor. Most asymmet- 
ries in response, such as those arising  from an inelastic housing stock, 
act with respect  to absolute  changes, rather  than  relative  ones. For this 
reason,  it would  be useful  to examine  absolute  changes  in population  by 
region, as well as regional  population  growth  relative  to the aggregate, 
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Gordon  observed  that  the paper  was unclear  about  whether  people or 
jobs moved first. Richard  Cooper  noted that, in the case of certain  Sun 
Belt states, people moved  in first,  for  example,  to retire,  thus stimulating 
the demand  for services and  creatingjobs.  Blanchard  agreed,  noting  that 
the tests in the paper  show only that  firms  do not move much  in response 
to wage differentials,  so that  the fall in wages following  a negative  shock 
to an area's labor  demand  is not enough  to induce  firms  to move. How- 
ever, the model was consistent with the idea that firms  may move to a 
region  for a variety  of reasons  other  than  the wage differential,  and  peo- 
ple may  follow. 
Susan  Collins  related  the paper  to European  experience, where  wage 
determination  is often nationwide.  In Italy, for example,  legislation  pro- 
hibits  bargaining  units  from  setting  wage differentials  between north  and 
south. This has been suggested as an important  reason for persistent, 
long-term  differences  in unemployment  rates between the two regions. 
She noted that, insofar as Europe moved toward cross-country bar- 
gaining  in the future,  the Italian  model would predict  that differences  in 
unemployment  would widen. However, if the results of the paper are 
valid  for Europe,  wage adjustments  are  relatively  unimportant  to the ad- 
justment  mechanism  and  more  centralized  negotiations  would  have rela- 
tively little effect. Based on German  experience, Lewis Alexander  sug- 
gested  that migration can play an important role in  equilibrating 
unemployment  rates across regions. He noted that during  the period  of 
high  in-migration  in the 1950s,  regional  unemployment  differences  were 
virtually  eliminated. Olivier Jean Blanchar-d  anid  Lawrence F. Katz  73 
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